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THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF NONLITERAL ELEMENTS
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
INTRODUCION
The goal of copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts."' It is premised on the assumption that "encourag[ing]
... individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors ... "2 In order to "promote pro-
gress," however, copyright law must respond to changes in technology.
Although historically Congress has done a commendable job in amend-
ing the copyright law to keep pace with technological advances, this has
not been true in the area of computer technology, perhaps the most sig-
nificant scientific advancement of modem times. As a result, the federal
courts have assumed the role of keeping the copyright law up-to-date in
this area.3 Although the courts were able to resolve the early, simpler
issues quickly and easily, they have had difficulty resolving the more com-
plex issues that have arisen as the computer industry has developed.
One issue that has been problematic for the courts is whether and to
what extent the nonliteral elements of computer programs are copyright-
able. Nonliteral elements are aspects of the computer program other
than the written code itself. For example, the structure of the program,
like the plot of a story, is a nonliteral element; the user interface 4 of the
program is another. Although it is clear that copyright protection ex-
tends to the literal elements of a computer program (the code), it is un-
clear to what extent protection extends to nonliteral elements. Because
entirely different lines of computer code could employ the same program
structure or create very similar user interfaces, programmers have a clear
interest in having nonliteral elements of their programs protected.
Judges, however, have had difficulty in determining the legitimacy of this
interest under the copyright laws.
The federal courts have articulated four distinct tests for determin-
ing whether nonliteral elements of a computer program can be protected
by a copyright in the program. All four tests are based on the idea-
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
3. The courts have interpreted Congress' inaction to have effectively shifted to them
the duty of keeping the copyright law current: "Rather than itself drawing the boundary
line between copyrightable and non-copyrightable elements of computer programs,
Congress has mandated that courts use an evaluative standard in determining this
boundary line .... " Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D.
Mass. 1990).
4. For a definition of the term "user interface," see infra notes 29-32 and
accompanying text.
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expression dichotomy that is the foundation for copyright law,5 yet they
are all significantly different from each other. In 1986, in Whelan Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,6 the Third Circuit became the
first Circuit Court of Appeals to address this issue. In 1990, the Federal
District Court of Massachusetts addressed the same issue but developed
its own approach in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional.7 In 1992, in the case of Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,8 the
Ninth Circuit applied its general test for substantial similarity, the Extrin-
sic-Intrinsic Test,9 in the computer program context. Finally, in 1992, the
Second Circuit developed its own test in Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.'0 The debate over these tests has centered on whether a
given approach "promotes progress" by providing an adequate level of
copyright protection, or whether it stifles creativity by providing either
too much or too little protection.
This Note argues that the Altai test, in modified form, is the best test
for determining substantial similarity-and hence copyrightability-be-
cause it most closely adheres to general principles of copyright law. Such
principles have served copyright law well in other areas and were in-
tended by Congress to be applied to computer programs as well.11 Part I
explains aspects of computer technology pertinent to this issue and pro-
vides a brief history of copyright law in the computer program context.
Part II examines the Whelan, Paperback, Brown Bag, and Altai cases and
provides a review of the criticism that has been leveled against each. Part
III analyzes these tests, concludes that a modified version of the most
sophisticated approach-the Altai test-would be best, and proposes an
additional step for the analysis under that test. Finally, it reexamines
5. The idea-expression dichotomy is simply that copyright law extends protection only
to the particular expression of an idea, but never to the idea itself. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-70.
6. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
7. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). This district court case is significant because of
the stature of the plaintiff, the developer of the very popular 1-2-3 spreadsheet program,
and because of the holding, which extended copyright protection to the user interface of
that program, see infra section II.B.
8. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
9. The test was already developed in existing case law. It was originally derived from
the Second Circuit's test announced in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir.
1946) (popular song). It was first adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-65 (9th Cir. 1977)
(children's television characters). The test was significantly modified in Shaw v. Lindheim,
919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1990) (television script). For a discussion of the
development of the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test, see infra note 178.
The Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test was also applied in one of the most significant computer
program cases to date, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-88-20149-VRW
(N.D. Cal.): 821 F. Supp. 616 (1993); 1993 WL 207982 (1993); 799 F. Supp. 1006 (1992);
1992 WL 75423 (1992); 779 F. Supp. 133 (1991); 759 F. Supp. 1444 (1991); 717 F. Supp.
1428 (1989); 709 F. Supp. 925 (1989).
10. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
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some of the major concerns that are often raised against providing any
protection to nonliteral elements of computer programs.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
In order to understand the issues raised by the copyrightability of a
computer program's nonliteral elements, it is necessary to have a basic
understanding of both computer programming and the general princi-
ples underlying copyright law. This Part provides background informa-
tion intended to give the reader a working knowledge of the subject
matter. First, it briefly discusses how computers work and how computer
programs are developed. It then reviews the legal landscape that cur-
rently surrounds the copyrightability of computer programs.
A. Some Technical Background on Computer Programs
A computer is basically a very sophisticated electronic machine used
to manipulate data. Since computers cannot think for themselves, how-
ever, they must be told exactly what to do. A computer program' 2 is the
part of a computer system that tells the computer what to do: it is basi-
cally a list of instructions that the computer executes to achieve the result
desired by the programmer.' 3 Computers, however, only comprehend
"machine language," a binary code consisting entirely of strings of Is and
Os (or ONs and OFFs), 14 which is awkward and difficult for people to
understand. Therefore, a programmer usually writes what is known as
the "source code" of a program using a "higher level" language' 5-e.g.,
BASIC, Pascal, or C. Since higher level languages are composed of words
and mathematical symbols, they are more easily understood by people
and are therefore easier to use. After the source code is written by the
programmer, it is then translated into machine language, called "object
code," 16 so that it can be understood by the computer.
12. Computer programs are also known as "software," as opposed to the physical
components of the computer system (such as the monitor, the storage devices, and the
computer itself), which are known as "hardware."
13. Copyright law defines a "computer program" as "a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
14. See 5 McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, Digital Computer
262, 262 (7th ed. 1992) [hereinafter E.S.T.]. Each binary digit-i.e., each 1 or 0 (or each
ON or OFF)-is called a bit of information; a string of eight bits is called a byte;, and a string
of one or more bytes is called a word. See Computer Systems Architecture, in 4 E.S.T.,
supra, at 276, 277. The computer manipulates such bits, bytes, and words to perform
whatever functions the program commands. See Digital Computer Programming, in 5
E.S.T., supra, at 269, 270.
15. See Digital Computer Programming, in 5 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 269, 271
("Programming... is far more awkward in binary and... becomes increasingly difficult as
programs get longer. For these and other reasons, programmers prefer to work in
languages that are at a higher level than ... machine language . ... ")
16. The process of translating source code into object code is called "compiling." See
Supercomputer, in 17 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 629, 632 (defining a "compiler" as "an
[Vol. 94:242
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There are two basic types of computer programs: "operating sys-
tems" and "applications." An operating system coordinates the interac-
tions between the hardware and the software in a computer system.
17
Applications, such as spreadsheets, word processors, or even video games,
perform the functions that the user desires. 18 Although much of what
can be said about one should also apply to the other, this Note focuses on
application programs, since they are easier to understand and are far
more numerous than operating systems.19
Computers are capable of only a limited number of arithmetical and
logical manipulations of data. Since they are very fast and thoroughly
accurate, they are able to perform very complex operations rather
quickly--but only if they are told exactly how to do so. It is the program-
mer who indirectly, by means of the program, walks the computer
through the process of solving a problem. Developing a program de-
mands more than merely sitting at the computer and writing the source
code. A multi-step process takes the program from the original idea to
the final product.20 At each step, the programmer progresses along the
scale of specificity, moving from the general idea to the precise instruc-
tions to be given to the computer.
First, the programmer decides what purpose the software will serve
for the user.21 For example, the required program may be an electronic
spreadsheet that performs all sorts of complex calculations on data, or it
may be a word processor that assists the user in drafting documents.
Second, the programmer determines the functions that will be
needed to meet the user's demands. 22 For example, the user might want
a spreadsheet program to perform instantly a host of mathematical, statis-
automatic translator of programs written in a high-level language... into the [ ]computer's
... machine operation codes"); see also 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.03[F], at 13-102.9 n.271 (1993) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright].
17. See generally Operating System, in 12 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 382, 382; see also 1
Michael D. Scott, Scott on Computer Law, § 3.11 [C], at 3-47 & n.189 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp.
1993).
18. See James V. Vergari & Virginia V. Shue, Fundamentals of Computer-High
Technology Law 22 (1991); see also 1 Scott, supra note 17, § 3.11 [C], at 3-48 & n.190.
19. Applications are said to "work under" or be "compatible with" a particular
operating system. Each computer will only have a limited number of operating systems.
For example, the IBM PC has three major operating systems: DOS, Windows, and OS/2.
However, each operating system has a great number of applications which are compatible
with it.
20. Sources differ as to the exact number and content of the steps involved in
developing a program. This account is drawn for the most part from Software
Engineering, in 16 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 531,531; a slightly different account is given in
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1992); many others
abound. Basically, however, the various accounts amount to the same procedure.
21. This step is called "requirements definition": "the basic question is what the user
expects the software to do." Software Engineering, in 16 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 531, 531.
22. This step is called "functional specification": here, "the user requirements are




tical, financial, and logical functions as the data are entered into the com-
puter. The user might also want the computer to present the results in a
variety of ways. Of course, the user would also need the program to be
able to save and retrieve information.23 Thus, the program would have to
be able to perform all of these functions.
Third, the programmer must "design" the overall structure of the
program. This consists of breaking down the various functions of the
program into subtasks that are easier for the programmer to understand.
The programmer designates each function as a "subroutine," or a mini-
program within the main program, and breaks down each subroutine
into further subroutines as necessary until each subroutine performs a
relatively simple task-i.e., one that is easily programmable. Then the
various subroutines must be organized in a logical and efficient pattern.
Typically, this is done in the form of a flow-chart that becomes the foun-
dation for writing the program code.
24
Fourth, the programmer must "implement" the design of the pro-
gram by actually writing the program's "code"25 To do this, the program-
mer must decide upon the proper problem-solving methods, or
algorithms, to use for each subroutine. The programmer then encodes
the design of the previous stage and each algorithm in the programming
language. The product is then compiled into object code.
Fifth, the program must be "debugged":25 errors in the program
must be found and corrected before the program is put to use. Since not
all errors are likely to be found before the program is put to use, a final
step of "maintenance"27 is required to correct any hidden errors and im-
prove any imperfections later discovered in the program. This final stage
is a continuous one, since errors may be encountered at any time during
the useful life of the program.
23. This is a very general account of the functions that are to be included. Before
moving on to the next stage, the programmer would have to determine exactly which
mathematical (e.g., addition, multiplication, root derivations, etc.), statistical (e.g.,
averages, regression analysis, etc.), financial (e.g., present value, amortization, etc.), and
logical (e.g., comparison, sorting, etc.) functions are to be performed by the program, as
well as exactly how the program will present its results (e.g., printing format, types of
graphs, etc.), and every other specific function the program will perform.
24. See Software Engineering, in 16 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 531, 532.
It is also important during this stage to "determin[e] the manner in which these
[subroutines] relate to one another," id.-for example, the "parameter list" for each
subroutine must be specified. For a definition of "parameter list," see Altai, 982 F.2d at
697-98 ("[The form in which information is passed between [subroutines] ...
25. See Software Engineering, in 16 E.S.T., supra note 14, at 531, 532.
26. The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology does not label any
stage "debugging." Instead, under its approach, errors in programming are to be
corrected during the implementation stage; the fifth stage is "testing" to make sure that the
program outputs are correct. Thus, the "debugging" stage-in which any errors that can
be found are corrected-encompasses both the fourth and fifth steps in the E.S.T.
approach. See id. This difference is not important as a practical matter.
27. See id.
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As should now be apparent, writing the actual code is only a small
part of developing a program; much more effort and creativity goes into
conceptualizing and designing the program. 28 This is the essence of the
"act of programming"; done well, it distinguishes a fine program (or
programmer) from an adequate one. Thus, the programmer has a
strong interest in copyright protection for more than merely the literal
code itself.
In addition to the structure of a computer program, nonliteral ele-
ments also include what is called the "user interface" of a program. The
user interface is the mechanism through which the user and the com-
puter communicate with each other.29 It includes the means for select-
ing the functions of the program as well as the screen displays and other
forms of output that are generated for such purpose.30 Most often, the
user interface allows for the selection of functions by organizing them in
a hierarchy of menus: the user is presented with a menu-i.e., a list-
from which to make a selection as to the type of function desired; this
selection typically leads to a submenu (or series of submenus in which
each level describes the possible choices with greater specificity, until the
final submenu is reached) that allows for the selection of the desired
function.
Developing a good user interface is often considered the most diffi-
cult and important part of programming.3 ' This is because the user in-
terface determines how easy the program is to use, which is in turn a
major factor in determining whether people will want to use this program
28. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass.
1990) ("[Tlhe bulk of the creative work is in the conceptualization of a computer program
and its user interface, rather than in its encoding.... ."); see also Whelan Assocs. Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he larger portion of the
expense and difficulty in creating computer programs is attributable to the development of
the structure and logic of the program, and to debugging, documentation and
maintenance, rather than to the coding.").
29. The user interface is often referred to as the "look and feel" of the program. In
Paperback, however, the court rejected the concept of "look and feel" as "[not] significantly
helpful" in determining copyrightability, and as "conclus[ory)" in that regard. See 740 F.
Supp. at 62-63.
30. See, e.g., id. at 63 (accepting plaintiff's definition of "user interface" as including
"'the menus (and their structure and organization), the long prompts, the screens on
which they appear, the function key assignments, [and] the macro commands and
language'" (brackets in original) (quoting Plaintiffs Post-Trial Brief at 53 (Docket No.
319))); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology- Rights,
Licenses, and Liabilities 1.12, at 1-72 (2d ed. 1992) ("The most common features [of a
user interface] are option menus, labels, key strokes to implement choices or commands,
and text describing what the choices accomplish.").
31. "[T]he 'look and feel' of a computer software product often involves much more
creativity and often is of greater commercial value than the program code which
implements the product..." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231 (quoting InfoWorld, Nov. 11, 1985,
at 13); see also Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 56 ("[C]reating a suitable user interface is a more
difficult intellectual task, requiring greater creativity, originality, and insight, than
converting the user interface design into instructions to the machine.").
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or a competing one.8 2 Thus, the holder of a copyright in a computer
program is often more interested in protecting the user interface from
infringement than in protecting the actual source code or object code.
33
Although programmers may have a strong interest in protecting the
user interface under copyright law, the user interface is a nonliteral ele-
ment of the program: entirely different programs (lines of code) could
create very similar, indeed identical, user interfaces.3 4 Thus, it is not im-
mediately clear whether the user interface deserves copyright protection.
B. The Copyrightability of Computer Programs
This section provides a brief review of the legal landscape in which
the copyrightability of computer programs rests. First, it gives a brief re-
view of the statutory history and some of the well-established general prin-
ciples of copyright law. Next, it turns to the legislative history on the
specific subject of the copyrightability of computer programs. Finally, it
reviews the early case law holding computer programs copyrightable.
1. The Statutory and Legislative History of Copyright Law. - Copyright
law is almost exclusively federal law. The Constitution grants Congress
the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."35 This broad delegation of au-
thority entitles Congress to determine, within constitutional limits, 3 6 the
level of copyright protection necessary to achieve the purpose of the
Copyright Clause. 37 Prior to 1909, Congress attempted to list in the copy-
32. Cf. Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, 1.08, at 1-61 ("In some programs, the
interface is unique and important and defines the program in its market by making it more
(or less) appealing to purchasers than competing programs.").
Of course, another major factor is the sheer power of the program. However, if the
program is too difficult for the user, it is not very useful despite its power. See GregoryJ.
Ramos, Note, Lotus v. Paperback: Confusing the Idea-Expression Distinction and its
Application to Computer Software, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 267, 277 (1992) ("A program that is
not easily used is a program that will not be used.").
33. Cf. Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, 1.12, at 1-72 ("[Mlany programs
perform identical functions, and only the user interfaces distinguish a popular program
from an unpopular one. This fact provides incentives for developers of popular programs
to protect their interface features against copying.").
34. See id. ("The user interface of a program can be copied without copying that
program's code.").
35. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
36. The text of the Constitution requires that the duration of the copyright be
limited. See id. In addition, originality is a constitutional requirement for copyrightability.
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991).
37. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) ("The
direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far
Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress."); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass. 1990) ("Under this constitutional
mandate, Congress has broad though not unlimited authority to grant copyright
monopolies as needed to promote progress.").
[Vol. 94:242
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right laws all works that would be copyrightable.38 With the Copyright
Act of 1909,39 Congress extended copyright protection generally to "all
the writings of an author,"40 and simply gave examples of works that
would be copyrightable.
41
The Copyright Act of 197642 replaced the 1909 Act and expanded
the subject matter of copyright as follows: "Copyright protection subsists
... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device."43 Congress provided a list of the catego-
ries of works that could be copyrighted, 44 but the list was merely intended
to provide examples of copyrightable works and was not meant to be ex-
haustive. 45 By way of limitation, however, the 1976 Act made it clear that
"[i] n no case does copyright protection... extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied."
4 6
38. See Paperback, 740 F. Supp at 47 (providing a chronology of additions to the
statutory list). Originally, copyright protected maps, charts, and books; by 1870, protection
had been extended to, inter alia, etchings and engravings, musical and dramatic
compositions, photographs and negatives, and statuary. See sources cited at id.
39. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
40. Id. § 4, 35 Stat. at 1076.
41. See id. § 5, 35 Stat. at 1076-77. The original list included "Books, including
composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations;"
"Periodicals, including newspapers;" "Lectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral
delivery;" "Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;" "Musical compositions;" "Maps;"
"Works of art; models or designs for works of art;" "Reproductions of a work of art;"
"Drawing or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;" "Photographs;" and "Prints
and pictorial illustrations." Motion pictures and sound recordings were added to the list,
in 1912 and 1972, respectively.
42. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in 17 U.S.C.).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
44. The list included "literary works," "musical works, including any accompanying
words," "dramatic works, including any accompanying music," "pantomimes and
choreographic works," "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," "motion pictures and
other audiovisual works," and "sound recordings." Id. § 102(a) (1)-(7).
The categories "literary works" and "audiovisual works" are particularly significant.
Congress intended computer programs to be protected under the former category, see
infra note 48 and accompanying text, but many people believe that nonliteral elements
such as the user interface ought to be protected, if at all, under the latter category, see
infra text accompanying notes 359-360. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 361-364.
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5666 (stating that list was to be "'illustrative and not limitative,' and...
[the] categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of 'original works of authorship' that
the bill [was] intended to protect.").
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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Although the list of copyrightable subject matter in the 1976 Act did
not include computer programs, 47 the legislative history clearly indicates
Congress' intent to protect computer programs under the category of
"literary works."48 Prior to the passing of the 1976 Act, Congress had
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) 49 to assess the adequacy of the copyright
laws in light of modem technological advancements such as photocopy
machines and, more importantly, computers.50 Congress decided to wait
for CONTU's recommendations before taking any major action on com-
puter programs.51 For the interim period, Congress included a provision
in the 1976 Act, § 117,52 to "preserve the status quo"-whatever that may
have been.53
47. In fact, the language of§ 102(b) of theAct,which excludes "process[es],system[s],
[and] method [s) of operation" might seem to exclude computer programs from copyright
protection altogether.
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining "[l]iterary [w]orks" to include works
"expressed in... numbers, or other... numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as... disks,. . . in which they are embodied"); see also
H.R Rep. No. 1476, supra note 45, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667 (stating
that category of "literary works" includes "computer programs to the extent that they
incorporate ... the programmer's expression of original ideas").
49. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-75. CONTU was
to be a short-lived commission whose sole purpose was to make recommendations for
amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976.
50. See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works 3 (1979) [hereinafter: CONTU Final Report] (defining CONTU's
purpose as "assist[ing] the President and Congress in developing a national policy for both
protecting the rights of copyright owners and ensuring public access to copyrighted works
when they are used in computer and machine duplication systems, bearing in mind the
public.., interest.").
51. See id. at 7 ("In anticipation of the work of [CONTU] and this report, the drafters
of the [1976 Act] explicitly stated that it did not address or deal with computer issues.").
52. The original § 117 for the 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 117, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565
(1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3082 (1980), reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title
does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable
of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction
with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under
the law, whether Title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action
brought under this title.
53. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 45, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5731.
It was never clear exactly what the status quo was, but since § 117 was to be only an
interim measure, it was not a very important issue. See 1 Scott, supra note 17, § 3.03, at
3-14 to -16. However, it was clear that this section "was not intended to deny copyright
protection to computer programs, but to allow for a period of further study." Raymond T.
Nimmer, supra note 30, 1.03[2], at 1-13. Apparently Congress intended to apply
protection to computer programs under roughly the same basis as other literary works
under the 1909 Act.
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The CONTU report54 was completed in 1978. CONTU concluded
that, since it is very difficult to develop computer programs but quite sim-
ple to copy them, copyright protection should be available for computer
programs to encourage their creation.55 CONTU did not believe that
very many changes would be required to achieve its objectives, since it
understood copyright law as it existed to be consistent with its views.
5 6
CONTU did suggest a few minor changes to the 1976 Act. For exam-
ple, CONTU recommended that a definition of "computer program"5
7
be added to § 101 of the 1976 Act "to make it explicit that computer
programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation,
are proper subject matter of copyright."58 CONTU also suggested that
§ 117 be repealed "to prevent any question concerning the impropriety
of program piracy and to assure that all works of authorship are treated
comparably under the new law."59 Finally, CONTU advised that a new
§ 117 be enacted 60 "to ensure that rightful possessors of copies of com-
puter programs may use or adapt these copies for their use."6 1 However,
CONTU did not make any recommendations concerning the scope of
copyright protection, believing that existing copyright principles were
adequate. 62
54. CONTU Final Report, supra note 50.
55. See id. at 11. Computer programs were already implicitly protected by the 1976
Act. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56. See CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 12.
57. See supra note 13.
58. CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 1.
59. Id. at 12-13.
60. Id. at 12. The text of the proposed new section was as follows:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: computer programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an infringement for
the rightful possessor of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize
the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program
provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only
and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued
possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of
all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only
with the authorization of the copyright owner.
The proposal was adopted with only a minor change: the word "possessor" was replaced by
the word "owner." Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). For the reasons behind this change, see 1
Scott, supra note 17, § 3.05[D], at 3-26 to -27.
61. CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 1.
62. See id. at 18 ("[CONTU's] discussion of what rights copyright proprietors have
and how those rights are limited does not depend upon [CONTU's] proposal but is based
upon various currently existing copyright doctrines.").
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Congress adopted CONTU's recommendations almost verbatim in
the 1980 Amendments to the 1976 Act.63 For this reason, many courts
have considered the CONTU Final Report as a form of surrogate legisla-
tive history.64 However, such use has more recently drawn criticism, espe-
cially with regard to the sections of the 1976 Act that remained
unchanged.65 Since the CONTU Final Report is filled with ambiguous
language,66 it is often cited to support contradictory propositions. 67 Its
usefulness is thus questionable, and it should only be cited carefully, and
with appreciation of its limitations.
68
2. General Principles of Copyright Law. - The most basic principle of
copyright law, known as the idea-expression dichotomy, is that copyright
protection extends only to the expression of an idea, and never to the
63. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980).
However, some minor changes were made to the CONTU recommendations. See, e.g.,
supra note 60.
64. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875-77 (3d Cir. 1982).
65. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1242 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) ("There is no sense in which [the CONTU
Final Report] represents the will of Congress with respect to provisions not amended in
response to the Report."); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54
(D. Mass. 1990) ("[C]ourts must not treat the CONTU [Final Report] as legislative history,
in the ordinary sense, much less as an authoritative statement about manifested legislative
intent.").
66. For example, the Report states that "one is always free to make the [computer] do
the same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted work placed in it, but only by one's own
creative effort rather than by piracy." CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 21. This
could seemingly stand for the proposition that no nonliteral aspects of a computer
program should be protected-i.e., that one could make a program that functions
identically as long as the program itself is entirely different. On the other hand, it could
just as easily stand for the -ordinary copyright principle that two authors, working
independently, could create identical works which would both be copyrightable. See 3
Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.01[B], at 13-13 to-15 ("[T)he trier of fact may
be upheld in finding no copying if such trier believes the defendant's evidence of
independent creation.").
67. An example can be found in the Report's statement that "[filow charts, source
codes, and object codes are works of authorship in which copyright subsists...." CONTU
Final Report, supra note 50, at 21. This has been interpreted by at least one court to
extend copyright protection to the "structure, sequence, and organization" of computer
programs. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241 ("[T]he reference to the copyrightability of
flowcharts [ ] demonstrates that [CONTU] intended copyright protection to extend beyond
the literal code."). On the other hand, it has also been used by at least one commentator
to support the proposition that CONTU "drew the line at the literal words of the
program." Ramos, supra note 32, at 271; see also id. at 274 ("CONTU's definition of a
flowchart clearly rejects [Whelan's] conclusion.").
68. It should be kept in mind that CONTU made no recommendations regarding the
scope of copyright protection, see supra note 62 and accompanying text. Moreover,
CONTU recognized its own limits and recommended that "[a]ny legislation... should be
subject to a periodic review to determine its adequacy in the light of continuing
technological change." CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 2.
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idea itself.69 A copyright confers only the right to the original expression
in a given work; the right to an idea (or design or process) is the subject
matter of patent law, which has much stricter regulations than does copy-
right.70 Since most progress is evolutionary rather than revolutionary,
the rate of advance would be severely impeded if a copyright prevented
future authors from using any ideas from previous works.71 By protecting
only an author's expression from unauthorized copying, copyright law
strikes a balance that is intended to "promote progress."
Thus, the nonliteral elements of computer programs should receive
copyright protection if, but only if, they can be classified as expression
rather than as ideas. Yet the distinction is not easy to realize in practice.
72
Therefore, the courts have developed a number of principles and tests to
help them decide whether a particular element of a copyrighted work is
an idea or an expression of that idea.
The first of these is the concept of "merger." In the landmark case
of Baker v. Selden,7" the Supreme Court held that a copyright does not
protect processes or methods of operation.74 In Baker, the plaintiff had
written a book describing a system of bookkeeping; the defendant pub-
lished his own accounting books employing that system. The court found
that, although the plaintiff's copyright protected his book from being
copied, it did not give him an exclusive right to the "art"-i.e., the book-
keeping system-described; such protection could only be derived from a
patent.75 Copyright protection for the plaintiff's work extended only to
his description of the art, which was not copied.7 6 The Court also held that
the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff's copyright by using ledger
sheets similar to those developed by the plaintiff. The Court reasoned
that, since the sheets were necessary to that method of bookkeeping, pro-
tecting the sheets would amount to the protection of the system of book-
69. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[Copyright] protection is given only
to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."); see also 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra
note 16, § 13.03[B11 [2] [a], at13-61 to-65.
70. "[Platent registration, with its exacting up-front novelty and non-obviousness
requirements, might be the more appropriate rubric of protection for intellectual property
of this kind." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
71. "[T]he copyright law has always recognized and tried to accommodate the fact that
all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238;
see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 77 (D. Mass. 1990)
("[The] general contention-that 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' cannot occur unless
authors.., are privileged to build upon earlier progress and... innovation-has long
been a virtually unchallenged premise in all branches of the law of intellectual property.").
72. Judge Learned Hand believed that "[n]obody has ever been able to fix th[e]
boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
73. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
74. This doctrine was subsequently codified into the Copyright law. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988), reprinted at supra text accompanying-note 46.
75. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
76. See id. at 104-05.
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keeping itself.77 Since the system was not protected, neither could the
sheets be protected. This holding became the foundation for the con-
cept of merger: when there is only one way, or a very few ways, to express
an idea, the expression is said to merge with its idea and is not protected
by copyright.78
A related principle is the concept of "scenes afaire." Scenes a faire are
"incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispen-
sable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic." 79 For exam-
ple, one could hardly present Nazi Germany without employing the
swastika;80 or, in the computer context, one could hardly use symbols
other than "+," "-," *," "/," and "=" to perform mathematical functions
in a computer program.8' Since scenes a faire are "indispensable, or at
least standard," they are not protected by copyright.82 They would other-
wise provide back-door copyright protection of ideas to the first person
who had used them: because no one else could use the "indispensable"
or "standard" expressions of those ideas, it would be difficult to use the
ideas at all.
A third limiting doctrine of copyright is the "useful article" doctrine.
A "useful article" is defined in the copyright law as "an article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information."8 3 Examples might be the
QWERTY keyboard arrangement or the figure-H stick-shift of an automo-
bile. 84 Under the "useful article" doctrine, a copyright does not extend
77. See id. at 103 ("[Where the art... cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public. .. ").
78. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) ("When
the.., subject matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic necessarily requires,' ... at best only
a limited number [of possible expressions), to permit copyrighting would mean that a party
... by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of
the substance."); see also Herbert Rosenthal jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) ("When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are ... inseparable, copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances
would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner. .. ").
79. Hoehlingv. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
80. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979.
81. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66-67 (D. Mass.
1990).
82. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979 ("Because it is virtually impossible to write about a
particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain 'stock' or standard
literary devices, we have held that scenes afaire are not copyrightable as a matter of law.").
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
84. The "QWERTY keyboard arrangement" is the standard arrangement of characters
on the keyboards of most typewriters and computers. It is named "QWERTY" after the
arrangement of the first six letter keys.
The "figure-H stick-shift" is the basic arrangement of gears in the manual transmission
of an automobile.
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protection to the utilitarian or functional aspects of a work.85 However,
the mere fact that an article may be useful does not bar protection for any
original expression separable from its usefulness.
8 6
The courts also employ a test known as the "Abstractions Test" to
help them parse an idea from the expression of an idea. Judge Learned
Hand first developed this test in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.87 While
that case involved copyright protection for a play, the Abstractions Test
has come to be applied generally to all types of literary works. Judge
Hand stated the test as follows:
Upon any work... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most gen-
eral statement of what the [work] is about, and at times might
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of ab-
stractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
88
By focusing on a scale of abstraction to distinguish ideas from expres-
sions, this test "implicitly recognizes that any given work may consist of a
mixture of numerous ideas and expressions."89 The Abstractions Test,
however, is not a bright-line test. Judge Learned Hand himself admitted
that "[d] ecisions [would] inevitably be ad hoc."90 Ultimately, it is the task
of the decision-maker to weigh all the facts and determine the appropri-
85. "[G] opyrightee [does not have] any rights to the mechanical or utilitarian uses of a
work of art." Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1953) (quoting Stein v. Mazer,
204 F.2d 472, 477 (4th Cir. 1953)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 45, 54-55,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C..N. at 5667-68.
86. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("We find nothing in the copyright
statute to support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article
eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."); see also Rosenthal, 205 F.2d at
635-37 (arguing that copyrighted work does not lose its status as such by being put to a
functional use); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 57-58 (D.
Mass. 1990) ("[T]he mere fact that an intellectual work is useful or functional... does not
mean that none of the elements of the work can be copyrightable.").
87. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
88. Id. at 121. In applying the Abstractions Test, the court focused on the characters
and the "sequence of incident," or the story line, of the plays in question. As to the former,
the court noticed some similarities between a few characters, but mostly on the level of
their prototypes. This was held to be too abstract to be protected. The court also noted
that "the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted." Id. As to the
latter, the court found similarities only in the broad outline (which was also too abstract to
be protected), and generally found the stories to be "quite different." See id. at 121. Thus,
while there were similarities on the highest levels of abstraction, the details were
sufficiently different that the expression in the first play was held not to have been copied
by the second play. At best, ideas were common to the two plays, but the ideas were not
copyrightable.
89. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03 [F] [1), at 13-102.18.
90. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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ate level at which to afford copyright protection to any given work.91 Nev-
ertheless, the Abstractions Test provides a useful framework through
which the decision-maker can better understand his or her responsibility.
The idea-expression dichotomy can also be found in the doctrine of
"compilations." It is possible even for works consisting entirely of other-
wise uncopyrightable elements to be protected under this rubric. 92 The
1976 Act defines "compilations" as "work[s] formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole consti-
tutes an original work of authorship."93 The Act explicitly limits the
protection of compilations by providing that the copyright in such a work
protects only the author's original contribution to the compilation94-
i.e., the selection, coordination, or arrangement. The protection af-
forded to compilations is "thin":95 the Act specifically provides that copy-
right protection does not extend to "the preexisting material employed
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material."96 Thus, protection for compilations does not contradict the
idea-expression dichotomy:97 the "ideas" (the otherwise uncopyrightable
elements) are not protected while the "expressions" (the selection, coor-
dination, and arrangement of those elements) are.98
A related doctrine is that of "total concept and feel,"99 originated by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co.100. The case involved alleged infringement of a copyright in greeting
cards. The court held that, although the textual materials in the greeting
cards at issue were not themselves copyrightable because they were in the
public domain, a "proper analysis of the problem require [d] that all ele-
ments of each card, including text, arrangement of text, art work, and
association between art work and text, be considered as a whole." 1'0 The
91. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60-61 (D. Mass.
1990).
92. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287-89 (1991)
("[E]ven a directory that contains absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts,
meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an original
selection or arrangement.").
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) (extending protection "only to the material
contributed by the author of such work").
95. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289; see also infra text accompanying notes 337-338.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
97. In compilations of facts, the dichotomy is referred to as the "fact/expression
dichotomy," but the concept is the same in either case. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
98. See id.
99. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[A] [1] (c],atl3-37to
-41; see also 2 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 14.03[G], at 14-45 to -49
(Release No. 2 1993) [hereinafter Abrams on Copyright].
"Total concept and feel" is also referred to as "look and feel," particularly in the
computer program context.
100. 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
101. Id. at 1109.
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court concluded that each of the plaintiff's cards, considered as a whole,
represented expression by the plaintiff and that the defendant had cop-
ied the "total concept and feel" of those cards. 10 2 The Roth case thus
stands for the proposition that a work can infringe on the copyright of
another if it copies the "total concept and feel" of the latter. Unfortu-
nately, through broad usage and expansion, the phrase "total concept
and feel" has caused a great deal of confusion: "it is [no longer] clear
whether the expression refers to the material to be protected by copy-
right, to the scope of the copyright protection, or to a test for determin-
ing copyright infringement." 0 3 The doctrine is therefore highly
controversial.
0 4
Once it has been shown that a particular item is a copyrightable ex-
pression and not an uncopyrightable idea, there are certain elements that
must be proven to make out a case of copyright infringement. A plaintiff
must prove ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the defendant
of protected expression.' 0 5 Since actual copying is often difficult to
prove, it may be shown indirectly by proving both access by the defendant
to the copyrighted work and a substantial similarity of the allegedly in-
fringing work to the copyrighted work.' 06 Proving access to a computer
program is usually not difficult, especially if it is a widely available com-
mercial product. 0 7 Thus, the issue in most computer program copyright
cases boils down to the question of substantial similarity between those
elements of the two programs that are considered to be expressive.
3. The Early Case Law Establishing the Copyrightability of Computer Pro-
grams. - Two early cases from the Third Circuit, Williams Electronics, Inc.
102. See id. at 1109-11.
103. Vergari & Shue, supra note 18, at 586-92 (discussing "'Look and Feel' cases").
The Roth case treated "total concept and feel" as the scope of copyright protection. For a
treatment of "total concept and feel" as the material to be protected by copyright, see 1
Scott, supra note 17, § 3.47[C] 1], at 3-199 ("Courts have found copyright infringement
due to the copying of the 'look and feel' [defined as the user interface] of a program in
many cases."). For a treatment of "total concept and feel" as a test for determining
copyright infringement, see Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)
("To constitute infringement of expression, the total concept and feel of the works must be
substantially similar.").
104. See 2 Abrams on Copyright, supra note 99, § 14.03[G],at 14-45 to-49 ("IT]he
phrase 'total concept and feel' should not be used as a test for infringement"); 3 Nimmer
on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[A] [1l [c],at 13-37 to-41 ("[T]hefrequentinvocations
of [the 'total concept and feel'] standard do little to bring order to the inquiry into what
constitutes substantial similarity, and would be better abandoned."); see also Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37, 62-63 (D. Mass. 1990) (rejecting
"look and feel" as "[not] significantly helpful" in determining copyrightability, and as
"conclus [ory]" in that regard).
105. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); see also 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.01, at
13-5.
106. See Sid & Mary Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162; see also 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra
note 16, § 13.01[B], at l3-11.
107. See 1 Scott, supra note 17, § 3.47[A], at 3-192.
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v. Artic International, Inc.'08 and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.,' 09 were particularly helpful in establishing the fundamental
copyrightability of the literal elements of computer programs. After
these early cases, it was clear that the literal elements of all types of com-
puter programs, whether applications or operating systems,"10 were copy-
rightable in any format, whether source code or object code."'
In Williams, the Third Circuit confronted, inter alia, the question of
whether the object code 1 2 of a program was copyrightable."-3 Both par-
ties were developers of video games; the defendant had copied the object
code from plaintiffs "Defender" video game. The defendant argued that
"a 'copy' must be intelligible to human beings and must be intended as a
medium of communication to human beings." 114 The court rejected this
argument because Congress intended the copyright law to encompass
"copies" made by electronic devices. Thus, the court held that computer
programs are copyrightable in both source code and object code
states. 115
In Apple, the Third Circuit faced the question of whether the operat-
ing system 1 6 of a computer system was copyrightable. 1 7 In addition to
expressly affirming a number of holdings from the Williams case, 118 the
court rejected defendant's assertions "that an operating system program
is a 'process,' 'system,' or 'method of operation' and hence uncopyright-
able.""19 The court noted that there was no intrinsic difference between
the instructions in an application, which were clearly copyrightable, and
108. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
109. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
110. See 1 Scott, supra note 17, § 3.11[C], at 3-51 & n.201 (citing cases).
111. See id. § 3.11[B], at 3-46 & n.188 (citing cases).
112. For the distinction between "source code" and "object code," see supra text
accompanying notes 15-16.
113. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir.
1982).
114. Id. at 876-77. This argument is similar to the one which prevailed in White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). In that case, it was held that a
player piano roll did not infringe the copyright on the music it would play because an
infringing copy must be "in a form which [people] can see and read." Id. at 17. This
doctrine was overruled in the 1976 Act by the language in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)
("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."). See 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 2.03[B] [1], at 2-28 to-29.
115. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 876-77.
116. For the distinction between an "application" and an "operating system," see
supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
117. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245,
1249-54 (3d Cir. 1983).
118. See id. at 1247-49.
119. Id. at 1250-51.
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those in an operating system. Thus, the court upheld the copyrightability
of all types of programs, be they applications or operating systems.' 20
II. A REvrEw OF FOUR SuBsTr1. SIm uTrrv TESTS FOR DETERMINING
THE COPYRiGH-rABIriY OF NoIjrERAL EIMENrs OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The courts have not been as unanimous about the appropriate scope
of protection that should be accorded the nonliteral elements of com-
puter programs as they have been for the literal elements. This Part re-
views the four leading cases on the issue of the copyrightability of the
nonliteral elements of computer programs. It examines the test for sub-
stantial similarity that is provided in each case and reviews some of the
criticism that has been leveled against each test.
A. The Whelan Approach: A Computer Program's "Idea" Is Its Purpose or
Function
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,121 the Third
Circuit became the first Circuit Court of Appeals to grapple with the issue
of whether the underlying structure of a computer program was copy-
rightable. 12 2 The facts of Whelan are as follows.' 23 Jaslow Dental Labora-
tories (the "Lab") hired Whelan Associates ("Whelan") to develop a
computer program-the "Dentalab" program-to computerize the Lab.
The agreement included a provision whereby the developer could sell the
program to others and the Lab would receive a ten percent commission
on such sales. However, the Lab had been developing its own version of
Dentalab, called "Dentcom," which would run on smaller computers and
which was therefore expected to have a larger potential market. The Lab
and Whelan eventually terminated their agreement, and each party con-
sidered itself the rightful owner of the Dentalab program. The Lab then
marketed both the Dentalab and the Dentcom programs, and Whelan
Associates continued to market the Dentalab program.
In the ensuing litigation, the district court ruled that Whelan was the
rightful owner of the copyright to the Dentalab program and that the Lab
had infringed this copyright in its sale of both the Dentalab and the
Dentcom programs.124 The Dentcom program did not copy either the
source code or the object code of the Dentalab program-in fact, it was
120. See id. at 1251 ("There is ... no reason to afford any less copyright protection to
the instructions in an operating system program than to the instructions in an application
program.").
121. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
122. See id. at 1224 (stating the issue as "whether the structure (or sequence and
organization) of a computer program is protectable by copyright, or whether the
protection of the copyright law extends only as far as the literal computer code" (brackets
in original)).
123. See id. at 1225-27.
124. See id. at 1228-29.
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written in a different language for a different computer system. Thus,
there was no literal copying of the program. However, most of the file
structures' 25 and screen outputs of the programs were virtually identical.
In addition, five key subroutines performed virtually identically, and
there were overall structural similarities. 126 On appeal, the only issue
before the court was whether the Dentcom program infringed upon the
copyright of the Dentalab system by copying nonliteral elements of the
program.
27
The circuit court first addressed whether these nonliteral elements
were copyrightable. It began by noting that the copyrights of other liter-
ary works could be infringed without any copying of the literal elements
of the work.128 Therefore, the court reasoned, the same should be true
of computer programs. 129 After reiterating the distinction between ideas
and expression,' 30 the court developed a test, purportedly based on Baker
v. Selden,13' for distinguishing idea from expression in computer
programs:
[T]he line between idea and expression may be drawn with refer-
ence to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question.
In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be
the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea .... Where there
are various means of achieving the desired purpose, ... the
particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence,
there is expression, not idea.'
32
The court went on to apply this principle very broadly:
[T]he purpose of the ... Dentalab program was to aid in the
business operations of a dental laborator .... It is... clear
that the structure of the [Dentalab] program was not essential to
that task: there are other programs on the market.., that per-
form the same functions but have different structures .... The
conclusion is thus inescapable that the detailed structure of the
Dentalab program is part of the expression, not the idea, of that
program.'
33
125. Computers store and retrieve information in "files." A "file structure" is the
format in which such information is organized in a file.
126. See 797 F.2d at 1228, 1246-48 (discussing testimony of expert witness as to
similarity of programs).
127. See id. at 1229.
128. See id. at 1234. The court gave this example: "One can violate the copyright of a
play or book by copying its plot or plot devices." Id. For a discussion of how a work may be
copied without literal similarities, see infra text accompanying notes 346-349.
129. See 797 F.2d at 1234.
130. See id.
131. 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
132. 797 F.2d at 1236.
133. Id. at 1238-39.
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The court believed that public policy--the goal of "promoting prog-
ress"-compelled its decisioniM and concluded that the CONTU Final
Report, in its reference to the copyrightability of flow charts,' 3 5 sup-
ported this approach.'
3 6
The court upheld the lower court's findings of substantial similarity
and announced a new rule that would extend copyright protection be-
yond a program's mere source code and object code to its nonliteral ele-
ments. In particular, protection would now encompass the "structure,
sequence and organization" of computer programs.'
3 7
The Whelan decision is most often criticized as "simplistic" in that "it
assumes that only one 'idea,' in copyright law terms, underlies any com-
puter program, and that once a separable idea can be identified, every-
thing else must be expression." 13 8 This is unrealistic given the nature of
computer programs, with their complex structure of subroutines,' 39 each
of which may have its own separable idea.'
40
Moreover, this broad definition of a program's idea 141 has been criti-
cized as providing too much protection.' 42 Since whatever is not "idea" is
protectable as "expression," it has been argued that the court should have
at least defined the idea in a much more detailed way in order to limit
this effect of its holding.143 Otherwise, programmers will have a difficult
time in trying to create competing programs that are at all similar to ex-
isting ones.
134. See id. at 1237 ("The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection
beyond the literal computer code, would provide proper incentive for programmers by
protecting their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the
development of new computer devices that accomplish the same end.").
135. See CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 21 ("Flow charts, source codes, and
object codes are works of authorship in which copyright subsists.").
136. See 797 F.2d at 1241. But see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 1248 ("[C]opyright protection of computer programs may extend
beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization.").
138. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [1],at12-102.17.
139. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
140. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992)
("[E]ach subroutine is itself a program, and ... may be said to have its own 'idea'.").
141. See supra text accompanying notes 132-133.
142. "Whelan has fared... poorly in the academic community, where its standard...
has been widely criticized for being conceptually overbroad." Altai, 982 F.2d at 705 and
sources cited therein.
143. The Abstractions Test teaches that the broader the definition of the idea, the
more the work will be protected. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91; see also Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting the
incentive for plaintiffs to "urge that the court conceive the 'idea' in a very generalized
sense," in order to achieve broad copyrightability for their program); Marc T. Kretschmer,
Note, Copyright Protection For Software Architecture: Just Say Nol, 1988 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 823, 837-39 ("[I]f the idea is broadly described, then any idea subsumed by the
broader idea becomes classified as expression and thereby enjoys copyright protection.").
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Finally, Whelan has been criticized for according protection to the
"structure, sequence, and organization" of computer programs. 144 Critics
of the Whelan test argue a program's structure is more akin to idea than
expression and therefore should not be protected. 145 These critics be-
lieve that protecting the structure of computer programs would go too far
and would impede progress in program development.'
46
B. The Paperback Approach: A Three-Part Test to Determine Copyightability
A second approach to copyrightability of nonliteral elements can be
found in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International.'47 The
issue before the District Court of Massachusetts in this case was whether
the user interface' 48 of the popular electronic spreadsheet program,
Lotus 1-2-3, was copyrightable.
The facts of Paperback are as follows.' 4 9 Recognizing the potential
market for an electronic spreadsheet program that was more powerful
than those available at the time, Lotus developed its own program, "1-2-
3," which quickly became the industry standard. At about the same time,
another programmer had been working on his own spreadsheet pro-
gram. In fact, he had completed a great deal of his own program, includ-
ing the menu hierarchy of the user interface, before he had ever seen 1-2-
3 in operation. However, before marketing the product, he decided that
to be successful the product would have to be compatible with 1-2-3.
Thus, he changed the menu hierarchy to conform to that of 1-2-3 and
marketed the resulting program, "VP-Planner," as a 1-2-3 "workalike."
Lotus eventually sued, charging that Paperback Software had infringed its
copyright in 1-2-3 by copying the user interface of that program.
144. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1084 (1989) ("[T]he Whelan court naively
reasoned that because a function could be performed in more than one way, its structure,
sequence, and organization is expressive and therefore copyrightable.").
145. See, e.g., Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?:
Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs,
88 Mich. L. Rev. 866, 896 (1990) ("[Plrotecting structure in its entirety runs the risk of
protecting the underlying ideas and processes."); Kretschmer, supra note 143, at 840
(arguing that structure, sequence and organization "fall[s] on the idea side of the [idea-
expression] continuum").
146. See Michael A. Jacobs, Copyright and Compatibility, 30 Jurimetrics J. 91, 103
(1989) (arguing that "if the structure, sequence and organization rules are extended
beyond the facts of Whelan .... development could be ... chilled"); Peter G. Spivak,
Comment, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 723, 747 (1988) ("The Whelan court's
protection of nonliteral structural similarity ... is hopelessly overbroad in theory, . . .
produces an inefficient result, . . . [and] will severely impede progress in the computer
programming field.").
147. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
148. For a definition of "user interface," see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text.
149. See 740 F. Supp. at 65-66, 68-69.
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As the Third Circuit did in Whelan,15 the district court here pointed
out that literary works can be infringed without any literal copying,'
5 '
and concluded that the same should hold true for computer pro-
grams.'5 2 Despite the defendant's argument that the proper test for
copyrightability should be based on a literal-nonliteral distinction, the
court believed that both the CONTU Final Report and congressional in-
tent supported an analysis based on the idea-expression distinction.'5 3
Thus, the court developed the following three-part test.
1 54
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability,"
the decisionmaker must focus upon alternatives that counsel
may suggest, or the court may conceive, along the scale from the
most generalized conception to the most particularized, and choose
some formulation-some conception or definition of the
"idea"-for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and
its expression. 55
This step was specifically intended to incorporate Judge Hand's Abstrac-
tions Test.' 56 In applying this step to the facts, the court noted that,
although the idea of an electronic spreadsheet is not copyrightable, a
particular expression of the idea of an electronic spreadsheet may be.'
7
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an al-
leged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to
expression of that idea (or is one of only a few ways of expres-
sing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of ex-
pression not essential to every expression of that idea.
5 8
This step incorporated the doctrines of merger and scenes a faire 5 9 In
applying the second step, the court rejected certain aspects of the 1-2-3
program as non-copyrightable, 160 including even "[t] he idea for a two-line
150. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
151. See 740 F. Supp. at 51-52 ("This type of copying of nonliteral expression, if
sufficiently extensive, has never been upheld as permissible copying; rather, it has always
been viewed as copying of elements of an expression of creative originality."); see also infra
text accompanying notes 346-349.
152. See 740 F. Supp. at 54.
153. See id.
154. This test was also applied in a subsequent case brought by Lotus before the same
court against another competitor, Borland, marketing another 1-2-3 workalike, Quattro
Pro. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992) (Borland
17); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., No. 90-11662-K (D. Mass.): 831 F. Supp.
223 (1993); 831 F. Supp. 202 (1993); 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992). For the facts of
Borland , see infra note 362.
155. 740 F. Supp. at 60.
156. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also
supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
157. See 740 F. Supp. at 65.
158. Id. at 61.
159. For "merger," see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text; for "scenes afaire,"
see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
160. For example, the "rotated 'L' screen display," and the use of the "/" key to
"invoke the menu command system," among other things. See 740 F. Supp. at 66-67.
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moving cursor menu."161 However, since that "idea" could be expressed
in an almost unlimited number of ways, the overall structure of the menu
hierarchy was held to be expression.
162
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential
to every expression of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus
on whether those elements are a substantial part of the allegedly
copyrightable "work."
In addressing this third element of the test for copyright-
ability, the decisionmaker is measuring "substantiality" not
merely on a quantum scale but by a test that is qualitative as
well.'
63
This is the stage at which the actual decision of substantial similarity is
made. Applying this step, the court concluded that the details of the
menu hierarchy were a substantial part of the program.164 Thus, the
court determined that the copyrightability of the user interface was
established.
16 5
Since it was clear that the developers of VP-Planner had copied the
user interface of the 1-2-3 program, 6 6 the court held that copyright in-
fringement had occurred. 167 This was so even though VP-Planner's user
interface was slightly different in that it included additional elements.' 6 8
For the most part, criticism of the Paperback case concerns the exten-
sion of protection to user interfaces rather than the actual test pro-
posed.169 It has been asserted that affording the user interface
protection is not a good way to carry out the constitutional goal of pro-
moting progress. For example, it has been argued that the user interface
of a program is a "useful article,"170 and therefore should not be pro-
161. Id. at 65.
162. See id. at 68.
163. Id. at 61.
164. See id. at 68.
165. See id. at 68-69.
166. See id. ("Not only is the copying in this case so 'overwhelming and pervasive' as
to preclude, as a matter of law, any assertion of independent creation, . . . but also,
defendants in this case have admitted that they copied these elements of protected
expression.").
167. See id. at 70.
168. "[S]ome additional commands are included at the end of some menu lines...."
Id.
169. See generally Gerard J. Lewis, Jr., Comment, Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software International: Broad Copyright Protection For User Interfaces
Ignores the Software Industry's Trend Toward Standardization, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 689,
692-93 (1991) (stressing need for software standardization); Joseph T. Verdesca, Jr.,
Comment, Copyrighting the User Interface: Too Much Protection?, 45 Sw. Lj. 1047,
1075-80 (1991) (same). But see Ramos, supra note 32, at 281-84 (arguing that Paperback
fails to address process-expression distinction adequately).
170. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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tected by copyright.171 The Paperback court explicitly considered and re-
jected this argument. The court clarified the "useful article" doctrine,
stating that while usefulness does not add to a copyright claim, neither
does it detract from such a claim: "Elements of expression, even if em-
bodied in useful articles, are copyrightable if capable of identification
and recognition independently of the functional ideas that make the arti-
cle useful."172
Another criticism that has been leveled against the result in Paperback
is that copying the user interface of a de facto standard product is neces-
sary to achieve standardization and compatibility in the software indus-
try.173 However, the court considered and rejected this argument as well,
stating that "the desire to achieve 'compatibility' or 'standardization' can-
not override the rights of authors .... "174
One last criticism often made against Paperback is that since "innova-
tion occurs by building on previous works," programmers should be free
to borrow and improve upon the ideas of other programmers.' 75 Again,
however, the court rejected such arguments, believing that as long as pro-
grammers are permitted to "borrow and improve upon previous ideas-
such as the ideas for an electronic spreadsheet and a two-line moving
cursor menu... [a] dequate room for innovation remains even though
successors are barred from copying earlier authors' particular expressions
"176
C. The Brown Bag Approach: The Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test
A third approach to the copyrightability of nonliteral elements of
computer programs was set forth in Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp. 177 The test employed by the Ninth Circuit in that case was not
171. See Lewis, supra note 169, at 710-12, 714-18; see also Synercom Technology,
Inc. v. Universal Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (concerning
computer input formats).
172. 740 F. Supp. at 58; see also Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635-37 (9th Cir.
1953); 740 F. Supp. at 57-58.
The Paperback court refused to pronounce a rule that would protect inferior works but
deny protection to superior works:
[T]he statute does not bar copyrightability merely because the originality of the
expression becomes associated, in the marketplace, with usefulness of the work to
a degree and in dimensions not previously achieved by other products on the
market.... Rather than promoting and encouraging both the development and
disclosure of the best, such a rule would offer incentives to market only the
second, or third, or tenth best, and hold back the best for fear that it is too good
for copyrightability. Copyrightability is not a synonym for imperfection.
Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
173. See Menell, supra note 144, at 1092-98; Verdesca, supra note 169, at 1075-79.
174. 740 F. Supp. at 69.
175. See Ramos, supra note 32, at 285.
176. 740 F. Supp. at 78.
177. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
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novel;178 the court was merely applying a general test of copyrightability
in the computer program context.
179
The relevant facts of Brown Bag are as follows.' 80 John L. Friend, an
independent computer programmer, developed an outlining program
called "PC-Outline." Friend sold the program to Brown Bag Software
("BBS"), but retained a non-exclusive right to part of the source code.
Subsequently, Friend developed another outlining program called
"Grandview." Friend sold this program to Symantec Corporation ("Sy-
mantec") who marketed the program as an updated version of its own
outlining programs. BBS sued Symantec and Friend alleging, inter alia,
that the Grandview program infringed BBS's copyright in PC-Outline. In
response to a summary judgment motion by the defendants, BBS submit-
ted a declaration setting forth seventeen features of the Grandview pro-
gram that were allegedly similar to those in the PC-Outline program.
The district court held that none of these features could support a find-
ing of copyright infringement and therefore granted the defendants'
summary judgment motion. BBS appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not address the issue of whether
the nonliteral elements of computer programs were protected by the
copyright law; existing precedent in the Ninth Circuit had established
178. The test had already been developed by existing case law. It was originally
derived from the bifurcated test of Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). The
first part of this test determined whether copying had occurred; here, analytical dissection
and expert testimony were permitted. The second part of the test determined whether the
copying was illicit; here, only the response of the ordinary lay observer was permitted. See
id. at 468-69.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a modified form of the bifurcated test-the Extrinsic-
Intrinsic Test-in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977). In the first phase, the "extrinsic test," an objective
determination is made as to whether there is a substantial similarity of ideas in the two
works; again, analytic dissection and expert testimony were permitted. In the second
phase, the "intrinsic test," a subjective determination is made as to whether there is a
substantial similarity in expressions of the two works; again, the determination depended
upon the response of the ordinary reasonable person. See id. at 1164. Although the Sid &
Mary Kroffi court quoted the Abstractions Test with approval, see id. at 1163, it did not
explicitly adopt the Abstractions Test as a part of its Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test. See id. at
1163-65.
The Ninth Circuit further modified the test in the case of Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d
1353 (9th Cir. 1990). The court stated that "[b]ecause the criteria incorporated into the
extrinsic test encompass all objective manifestations of creativity, the two tests are more
sensibly described as objective [for the extrinsic test] and subjective [for the intrinsic test]
analyses of expression, having strayed from Krofft' division between expression and ideas."
Id. at 1357. This is the current form of the test and the one adopted by Brown Bag for the
computer program context. See 960 F.2d at 1474.
179. Neither Sid & Marry Kroffi nor Shaw involved computer programs. The Sid &
Mary Kroffi case involved the fictional worlds and characters in the "H. R. Pufnstuf"
television show and the "McDonaldland" television commercials. See 562 F.2d at 1160.
The Shaw case involved a television series, "The Equalizer." See 919 F.2d at 1355.
180. See 960 F.2d at 1468-69, 1472-73.
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that they were if they qualified as expression. 18 1 Instead, the court simply
applied the existing two-part test for determining substantial similarity-
the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test.
182
The first phase of that test is the "extrinsic test," which involves an
"objective ... analys[is] of expression."183 In this phase, individual ele-
ments of the copyrighted work are analytically dissected-and unprotect-
able elements of expression eliminated from consideration-in order to
define the scope of the plaintiff s copyright.' 8 4 Since it is an objective
test, expert testimony is admissible and a determination can be made as a
matter of law.' 85
In applying the extrinsic test, the district court had compared the list
of features, including screen displays, function menus, and keystrokes,
that were alleged by the plaintiff to be similar.' 8 6 The district court had
analyzed these features and concluded that they could not support a
claim of copyright infringement under various copyright doctrines: e.g.,
some features basically merged with their ideas or were scenes a faire,
others were purely functional, and still others had been licensed to Mr.
Friend by BBS.' 8 7 The court had also held that the remaining features
were simply not substantially similar as a matter of law.188 Thus, the court
had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the substance of this analysis in its entirety. 189
The second phase of the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test is the "intrinsic test."
It is triggered only in cases where the court finds objective similarities of
protected expression.' 90 The "intrinsic test" is a subjective test that meas-
181. "Whether the non-literal components of a program, including the structure,
sequence and organization and user interface, are protected depends on whether, on the
particular facts of each case, the component in question qualifies as an expression of an
idea, or an idea itself." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding finding of substantial similarity).
182. For the development of this test in prior case law, see supra note 178.
183. 960 F.2d at 1475 (quoting Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357).
184. "[A] nalytic dissection is used not for the purposes of comparing similarities and
identifying infringement, but for the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff's
copyright." Id. at 1475-76.
185. "Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a matter of law." Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977).
186. See 960 F.2d at 1475.
187. See id. at 1472-73.
In this stage of the "extrinsic test," the court excludes any elements that cannot be
protected by the plaintiff's copyright from consideration. For a more detailed analysis
under the "extrinsic test," see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006,
1020-22 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
188. See 960 F.2d at 1473.
189. See id. ("We reject each of [the plaintiff's] contentions.").
190. "If the similarity of the works in suit stems solely from unprotectible features,
then the plaintiff's case is missing an essential element of infringement. . . . [and]
summary judgment is plainly appropriate before reaching the 'intrinsic test.'" Apple
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ures "substantial similarity in expressions... depending on the response
of the ordinary reasonable person .. ." 91 It compares the protected
elements determined under the "extrinsic test" 192 to assess-without the
help of analytic dissection or expert testimony' 9 3-whether there is sub-
stantial similarity in the "total concept and feel" of the two works.
194
Since the test is purely subjective, it is "a task no more suitable for ajudge
than for a jury," and is therefore a question for the trier of fact.19 5
Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit ever reached the "intrin-
sic test" in Brown Bag since, after its ruling on the "extrinsic test," there
were no remaining triable issues of fact.
The Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test has been criticized on the ground that, if
a work fails to pass the "extrinsic test," the "intrinsic test" is never trig-
gered.196 Since under the "extrinsic test" the court dissects the program
into its elements and analyzes each element's copyrightability individu-
ally, the court may never consider whether the program as a whole de-
serves copyright protection. 197 Moreover, the distinction between
objectivity and subjectivity in analysis of similarities has been character-
ized as "rather malleable" and easily manipulable. 198 Thus, it would be
Computer, 799 F. Supp. at 1020 (citations omitted); cf. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1476
("[S]atisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable issue of fact .... " (quoting Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d at 1359 (9th Cir. 1990))).
191. 960 F.2d at 1475 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)).
192. "[T]he 'intrinsic test' entails a comparison of the portions of a work that can be
the subject of copyright protection." Apple Computer, 799 F. Supp. at 1020.
However, it is not entirely clear what is supposed to be compared in the intrinsic test:
The degree to which unprotected or unprotectable features must be eliminated
from a comparison of two works is difficult to say. Although copyright protection
is not afforded to certain elements of a work, such limitations "must not obscure
the general proposition that copyright may inhere, under appropriate
circumstances, in the selection and arrangement of unprotected components."
Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1476 n.4 (quoting 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16,
§ 13.03FI[5]).
193. See 960 F.2d at 1475 (quoting Sid & Marry Kroffl, 562 F.2d at 1164).
194. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1360 ("What remains is a subjective assessment of the
'concept and feel' of the two works . . .
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., David A. Lowe, Comment, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Proper
Substantial Similarity Test for Nonliteral Aspects of Computer Programs, 68 Wash. L. Rev.
351, 363 (1993) (arguing that nature of computer programs is such that while two works
may appear dissimilar in literal aspects, "look and feel" may in fact be quite similar).
This was even more problematic before the Shaw opinion transformed the "extrinsic
test" into an objective analysis of expression, see supra note 178. When the "extrinsic test"
was an analysis of similarity of ideas, it was theoretically possible for the court to grant a
summary judgment on the ground that the ideas of the two works in question were
different, without ever considering the similarities in expression. See Mitchell
Zimmerman, Substantial Similarity of Computer Programs After Brown Bag, 9 No. 7
Computer Law. 6, 7-8 (1992).
197. See Lowe, supra note 196, at 363.
198. See Zimmerman, supra note 196, at 15.
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simple for ajudge inclined against protection to characterize the expres-
sions at issue as "objectively" dissimilar and thereby avoid the "intrinsic
test" entirely.199
The "intrinsic test" has itself been faulted as an amorphous test more
akin to a gut reaction than to analysis.20 0 It has been argued that, partic-
ularly in cases involving complex subjects such as computer programs,
such an oversimplified analysis is entirely inappropriate. 20 1 Moreover, it
has been criticized as a dangerous test in that it is very likely to result in
the protection of ideas themselves rather than just expression.
202
However, the area in which Brown Bag is most susceptible to criticism
is in the inadequacy of definition of its test. There is no formulation of
the test other than at the most general levels. The "analytic dissection" of
the "extrinsic test" is a highly complex process, 203 yet the court provides
scant guidance as to what it entails other than incidentally by way of ex-
ample.20 4 The court also hedges its description of the "intrinsic test" and
never definitively states what should be considered during that stage.2 0 5
The test needs refinement.
D. The Altai Approach: The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test
In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,206 the Second
Circuit articulated a fourth test for determining whether the nonliteral
199. See id. at 15-16.
200. The "intrinsic test" embodies the doctrine of "total concept and feel." See supra
text accompanying note 194. This doctrine has been criticized extensively. See supra note
104.
For a general review of the doctrine of "total concept and feel," see supra text
accompanying notes 99-104.
201. See, e.g., 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[A] [1] [c],at 13-39to--40
("The phrase is geared towards simplistic works that require only a highly 'intrinsic' (i.e.,
unanalytic) evaluation; it serves no purpose in the realm of computers where analytic
dissection and expert testimony emphatically are needed." (footnote omitted)).
202. See, e.g., id. at 13-40 ("[Tlhe touchstone of 'total concept and feel' threatens to
subvert the very essence of copyright, namely the protection [only] of original expression."
(footnotes omitted)); see also 2 Abrams on Copyright, supra note 99, § 14.05[A][3],at
14-63 ("There is nothing in the definitions of concept and feel that indicate these words
are useful tools to sort out copying of expression from copying of ideas. If anything, the
opposite is true. The word '[concept]' is a synonym for idea, and not for expression."
(footnote omitted)).
203. For a thorough application of the analytic dissection of the "extrinsic test," see
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1027-41 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(comparing visual displays of Apple Macintosh with those of Microsoft Windows).
204. The best guidance comes from the court's description of what the district court
had done. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (9th Cir.
1992). Not much additional guidance can be gleaned from the other decisions that have
helped to develop the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th
Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977). This stands in stark contrast to the other court opinions considered in this
Note which have managed adequately to describe their own tests.
205. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
206. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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elements of a computer program would be protected by copyright.207
The facts of Altai are as follows. 20 8 Computer Associates ("CA") devel-
oped "ADAPTER," an "operating system compatibility component"
209
within one of its programs that allowed the program to function on vari-
ous operating systems. One of the developers of the ADAPTER program
was subsequently hired by Altai to create a version of its own program for
other operating systems. Unbeknownst to Altai, this programmer devel-
oped a "common system interface"2 10-to be called "OSCAR 3.4"-based
on his familiarity with the ADAPTER program; he even directly copied
30% of ADAPTER's code. When CA sued Altai, Altai had programmers
who had not been involved in the development of OSCAR 3.4 rewrite the
stolen sections of the code. The new program, "OSCAR 3.5," was in-
cluded in all new sales and was offered as a "free upgrade" to all previous
purchasers.
CA brought suit alleging that Altai had infringed CA's copyright in
ADAPTER by copying the code and the structure of the program in its
OSCAR 3.4 and OSCAR 3.5 programs. The district court held Altai liable
for copying ADAPTER into the OSCAR 3.4 program;21' this decision was
not appealed. The district court also held that Altai was not liable for
copyright infringement in developing OSCAR 3.5,212 and this decision
was appealed by CA213
In determining whether the nonliteral elements of the program were
copyrightable, the Second Circuit noted, as did the previous courts, that
copyright protection generally extends beyond a literary work's strictly
textual form to its nonliteral elements of expression.214 The court there-
fore looked to the idea-expression dichotomy in deciding the case.
215
However, the court rejected the Whelan approach as simplistic and con-
ceptually overbroad,216 announcing instead its own "Abstraction-Filtra-
tion-Comparison" test.
217
207. See id. at 706-11.
208. See id. at 698-700.
209. An "operating system compatibility component" is a program that allows the
main program to be compatible with various operating systems.
210. Basically, a "common system interface" is just another name for an "operating
system compatibility component."
211. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560-61 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
212. See id. at 562.
213. The court also made trade secret rulings which were appealed. See Computer
Assocs., Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715-21 (2d Cir. 1992); 775 F. Supp, at
562-67. These rulings, however, are not considered in this Note.
214. See 982 F.2d at 701; see also infra text accompanying notes 346-349.
215. See 982 F.2d at 703-06.
216. See id. at 705-06.
217. See id. at 706-11. The court was basically adopting the "successive filtering
method" developed in 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F]. See 982 F.2d at
707.
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Initially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a
theoretical plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied
program's structure and isolate each level of abstraction con-
tained within it
21 8
This step incorporates Judge Hand's Abstractions Test.2 1 9 The court ac-
cepted the district court's assessment of the levels of abstraction to in-
clude "in order of 'increasing generality' from object code, to source
code, to parameter lists,22 0 to services required, to general outline."221
The second step, calling on traditional principles of copyright, filters
out those elements of the program that are not copyrightable:
This process entails examining the structural components at
each level of abstraction to determine whether their particular
inclusion at that level was "idea" or was dictated by considera-
tions of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea;
required by factors external to the program itself or taken from
the public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression. 222
Elements "dictated by considerations of efficiency" are to be excluded
from copyright protection under the concept of merger.223 Elements
"required by factors external to the program itself"-upon which the
opinion elaborates 224-- are to be excluded under the concept of scenes a
faire.2 25 Finally, elements "taken from the public domain" are not pro-
tected because they are not "original works of authorship" under the
1976 Act.22 6 Applying this step, the court agreed that there was no simi-
larity in the two programs' codes and in most of the parameter lists and
macros, 227 and that the list of services provided and organizational struc-
tures were not protected because they were dictated by the nature of the
218. 982 F.2d at 707.
219. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also
supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
220. The court defined "parameter lists" as "the form in which information is passed
between [subroutines]." 982 F.2d at 697-98. (footnote added)
221. Id. at 714 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544,
560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). However, the court noted that "the facts of a different case might
require that a district court draw a more particularized blueprint of a program's overall
structure." Id.
222. Id. at 707.
223. See id. at 707-09; supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
224. The court elaborates as follows:
[A] programmer's freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic
considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on
which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of
other programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3)
computer manufacturers' design standards; (4) demands of the industry being
serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer
industry.
982 F.2d at 709-10 (citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3]).
225. See id. at 707, 709-10; supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
226. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
227. "A macro is a single instruction that initiates a sequence of operations ... within
the program." 982 F.2d at 698.
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program. 22s The court found that only a few parameter lists and macros
could withstand scrutiny and be protected by copyright.229
The third step of the Altai test was expressed as follows:
Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly in-
fringed program which are [non-protectable], there may remain
a core of protectable expression .... At this point, the court's
substantial similarity inquiry focuses on whether the defendant
copied any aspect of this protected expression, as well as an as-
sessment of the copied portion's relative importance with re-
spect to the plaintiff's overall program.
230
This is the comparison stage, at which the decision-maker determines
whether any copying constitutes infringement. The court upheld the dis-
trict court's finding that since only a few copyrightable elements re-
mained, a finding of copyright infringement was not required given their
relative unimportance to the program.
23'
The Altai decision has been greeted with a mixed reception by both
the courts23 2 and commentators.233 The test should have the support of
the leading expert in the field, Professor David Nimmer, since the test
was based on the "successive filtering method" from his own Nimmer on
Copyright treatise.2
3 4
However, the Altai test has been criticized as being underprotective
due to the rigors of the successive filtering.235 Moreover, another profes-
sor, Raymond T. Nimmer, has challenged the legitimacy of the holding,
apparently believing that it was based on a presumption of what program-
mers would prefer rather than on a neutral reading of the law.235 He
argues that the "efficiency demands of programmers"-i.e., that they be
228. See id. at 714-15.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
231. See id. at 714-15.
232. See 1 Scott, supra note 17, § 3.47[B] [5], at 3-198.6 & n.966.16 (citing cases).
233. Compare Dennis M. McCarthy, Recent Decision, Copyright Infringement-
Redefining the Scope of Protection Copyright Affords the Non-Literal Elements of a
Computer Program-Computer Associates Internationa, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 66 Temp. L. Rev.
273 (1993) (praising Altai for its realistic understanding of computer programming and its
promotion of both private innovation and public good) and Timothy S. Teter, Note,
Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility Trend in Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 1084-86 (1993) (approving Altai's use of
merger doctrine which allows copying of elements needed to achieve compatibility), with
Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, Special Update (explaining that concerns about
efficiency and technological development, rather than wording of statute, drive Altai
decision) and Recent Case, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 510, 511 (1992) (predicting that Altai's three-
part test will "discourage innovative programming techniques and leave non-literal
elements of computer programs under-protected").
234. See 982 F.2d at 707; see also 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03F],
at 13-102.9 to -102.35.
235. See, e.g., Recent Case, supra note 233, at 512-14 (criticizing use of merger and
scenes afaire doctrines as problematic in computer program context).
236. See Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, Special Update 4-5.
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free to copy whatever they find efficient in a competing program-and
the "demands of compatibility and interface"-i.e., that programmers be
free to copy whatever is required by external factors, such as compatibil-
ity-are not valid defenses to copyright infringement on current statutory
grounds. 23 7 Although such "efficiency demands" and "compatibility re-
quirements" may be the appropriate subject of legislation by Congress,
they find little or no support in the 1976 Act.
23 8
This criticism raises some valid concerns. A copyright should not be
subject to qualification merely because a competitor finds the copy-
righted expression to be the "best" in some sense. Nevertheless, a careful
reading of this so-called "right to copy[ ] based on the demands of [effi-
ciency]" 239 as developed in Nimmer on Copyight reveals that the concerns
are not as problematic as they seem. It is true that both the Second Cir-
cuit and the Nimmer treatise list a number of extrinsic considerations
that would limit the copyrightability of a program,240 but these are merely
applications of copyright principles, such as merger or scenes afaire, in the
computer program context. Unlike ordinary literary works, where the
range of expression is limited only by the author's imagination, computer
programs must be written in a logical format so that they can be under-
stood by the computer:24' computers simply cannot understand such ex-
pressive literary devices as metaphor, simile, hyperbole, and the like.
This necessarily limits, though not entirely, the range of possible expres-
sion at least of a program's literal elements and structure. 242 The doc-
trines of merger and scenes a faire are perfectly suited to taking such
factors into consideration.
Moreover, none of the extrinsic limitations on copyrightability-e.g.,
the "compatibility requirements"-are intended to permit illicit copying
of "original works of authorship." Instead, they generally concern either
elements that as a practical matter are not likely to be guarded by the
original developer243 or elements that are not "original works of author-
237. Id. at 4.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 5.
240. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2d Cir.
1992); 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3],at 13-102.21 to-102.28.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
242. Since computers can perform only a limited number of operations, individual
lines of the program's literal code will obviously not be very expressive. Combining these
operations to create more complex functions and the overall structure of a program clearly
allows for more expression. Nevertheless, the range of possible expression is still
significantly limited by comparison to natural languages.
243. One such factor not likely to be jealously guarded is "Software Standards" or
compatibility requirements. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3][b],at
13-102.23 to -102.24. While the mere fact that designers would like a program to be
compatible with another does not necessarily permit copying, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass. 1990), Nimmer limits his discussion
to compatibility with operating systems. These are usually created to encourage
compatibility: the more applications that are available for it, the more popular the
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ship" at all. 244 At no point does this test suggest that otherwise copyright-
able elements should be unprotected merely because programmers
would find this result beneficial.
III. ANALxsis AND PROPOSAL
As discussed above, the courts have developed four separate tests for
determining the scope of copyright protection that should be afforded to
the nonliteral elements of computer programs. This Part compares the
four tests to determine to what extent they are compatible and, to the
extent that they are not, whether they are reconcilable. Next, an attempt
is made to determine which of the tests is preferable from the standpoint
of copyright doctrine. After concluding that the best approach would be
a modified version of the most sophisticated test, the Altai test, an addi-
tional step in the analysis is proposed to deal with problems that may be
inherent to that test. Finally, some of the major concerns regarding the
copyrightability of nonliteral elements are re-evaluated from the perspec-
tive of this modified Altai test.
A. Comparison and Reconciliation of the Tests
The court that developed each test quoted Judge Hand with
praise24 5-but not every court adopted his Abstractions Test.2 46 The Pa-
operating system becomes. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp.
1428, 1431 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("Both Apple and Microsoft rely heavily on third-party
programmers to develop applications programs to run under their respective operating
environments, thus enhancing the value of the operating environments.").
Another such factor is "Manufacturers' Design Standards." See 3 Nimmer on
Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3] [c],atl3-102.24to-26. These are not likely to be
jealously guarded for the same reasons that operating systems are not. Thus, such factors
do not present a problem.
244. One such factor is "Target Industry Practices." See 3 Nimmer on Copyright,
supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3] [d],at13-102.26. In this case, Nimmer is referring to two
programs which may be similar based on factors external to both of them, such as
"business practices and technical requirements," and therefore beyond their control. See
id. Clearly program elements based on such external factors are not "original works of
authorship" under the 1976 Act and would not be protected. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1988).
Another factor is "Computer Industry Programming Practices." See 3 Nimmer on
Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [3] [e],atl-102.27to-102.28. These are obviously not
original to the programmer.
Nimmer also lists "Hardware Standards." See id. § 13.03[F] (3] [a], at 13-102.21 to
-102.23. In order to make a computer perform a certain function or process, particular
lines of code may be necessary. But since it is generally accepted that "one is always free to
make a machine perform any conceivable process," CONTU Final Report, supra note 50,
at 20, any similarity between programs based on the requirements of the computer cannot
be protected.
245. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992);
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977) (quoted in Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990)); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass. 1990).
246. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); supra
text accompanying notes 87-91.
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perback and Altai tests explicitly incorporate the Abstractions Test; the
Whelan and Brown Bag 247 tests do not. Thus, the first issue to be consid-
ered is whether the Abstractions Test is incompatible with the Whelan and
Brown Bag decisions.
Whelan might at first glance seem incompatible with the Abstractions
Test. After all, the Abstractions Test states that the "idea" of a work can
be adjudged at various levels of specificity,2 48 while Whelan stated that the
idea of a work is its purpose or function.249 Not everyone agrees with this
interpretation of Whelan, however.250 The Whelan court itself stated that
the idea of a work will not always be its purpose or function.251 As an
example, the court stated that "[t]he idea... may be to accomplish a
certain function in a certain way."252 Thus, the court implicitly recognized
that the idea of a work may be adjudged at various levels of specificity
after all.2 53 In the end, all of the approaches face the same question of
where to draw the line between idea and expression. 254 Thus, the Ab-
stractions Test could to a large extent be incorporated into the Whelan
test without substantially altering its character: when deciding how to
characterize the program's purpose-i.e., its idea-the court could easily
apply the Abstractions Test.255
247. The "Brown Bag test" will be used hereinafter to refer to the Extrinsic-Intrinsic
Test of the Ninth Circuit, see supra section II.C.
248. For a review of the Abstractions Test, see 45 F.2d at 121; supra text
accompanying notes 87-91.
249. See 797 F.2d at 1236; supra text accompanying note 132.
250. Professor Raymond T. Nimmer states:
[M]any observers regard Whelan as establishing a view that a single idea can
describe a program and that this idea can be stated in very general, nonspecific
terms .... In fact, however, Whelan held that copyright infringement occurs only
if the details of a complex organization or structure have been copied and only if
those details are not necessary to the idea of the work.
Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, Special Update 1 (emphasis in original).
251. "We do not mean to imply that the idea or purpose behind every utilitarian or
functional work will be precisely what it accomplishes, and that structure and organization
will therefore always be part of the expression of such works." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238
n.34.
252. Id.
253. At one level of abstraction-probably the highest-the idea is "the efficient
organization of a dental laboratory." Id. at 1240. At another level, the idea might be the
efficient organization of a dental laboratory in a certain way.
254. Compare supra note 253 with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F.
Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1992) (Borland I) (setting forth a number of possible "ideas" for
the 1-2-3 program at various levels of abstraction).
255. To a certain extent, incorporating the Abstractions Test into the Whelan test
would be unavoidable. The Whelan court was faced with a single purpose program: one
created to manage dental laboratories. More often, however, the program in question is a
general purpose program. For instance, Paperback dealt with a spreadsheet program. In
such a case, it would be difficult to ascribe one particular purpose or function to the
program. Regardless of whether a court explicitly adopted the Abstractions Test, it would
inevitably face the challenge of deciding at what level of detail to describe the program's
"idea."
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Under the Brown Bag test, on the other hand, the court never has the
opportunity to focus on the difference between idea and expression in
the program. Instead, the court is presented with a list of elements which
the plaintiff claims were copied in the infringing work.25 6 To be sure, the
court must decide whether each element is closer to idea or expres-
sion, 257 but the benefit of the Abstractions Test is lost: since the court
never systematically evaluates the relationship between idea and expres-
sion in the program, each individual element is truly evaluated on an
entirely ad hoc basis.
258
A closely related issue is whether the tests are capable of recognizing
that a program can have more than just one idea. Both the Paperback and
the Altai courts do.2 59 However, the Altai court does so more explicitly,
recognizing even the existence of multiple ideas horizontally-i.e., recog-
nizing that each subroutine, function, or feature of the program can have
its own idea.260 The Paperback decision only seems to recognize the con-
cept of multiple ideas vertically-i.e., that a program's idea can be ex-
pressed in various degrees of abstraction.2 61 Nevertheless, there is
nothing inherent to the Paperback test that prohibits the recognition of
multiple ideas horizontally.262 If the first step in the Paperback test is per-
mitted to recognize such multiple ideas horizontally, then each of these
ideas could be subjected to the second and third parts of the test without
any great difficulty.
256. See supra text accompanying note 186; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (plaintiff submitted list of 189
similarities in particular features between copyrighted and allegedly infringing works).
257. The court applies the various limiting doctrines of copyright to ensure that only
expression and not ideas are protected. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
258. EvenJudge Learned Hand himself realized that"[d]ecisions [will] inevitably be ad
hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
Nevertheless, the Abstractions Test is an attempt to assist courts in their determinations-
and to make their decisions less arbitrary. See supra note 87-91 and accompanying text.
259. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 215 (D. Mass. 1992) (Borland 1I)
(discussing the Paperback test).
260. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 705 ("[E]ach subroutine is itself a program, and thus, may
be said to have its own 'idea. . ").
261. See Borland H, 799 F. Supp. at 216 (describing the multiple ideas of the 1-2-3
program in terms of specificity). Note that both Paperback and the Borland cases were
decided by Judge Keeton, involved similar issues, and applied the same test.
262. The court has been criticized for not having recognized multiple ideas
horizontally, though not in those terms. See Thomas K. Pratt, Comment, A Legal Test for
the Copyrightability of a Computer Program's User Interface, 39 Kan. L. Rev. 1045, 1065
n.152 (1991) ("The [Paperback] court made the mistake of referring to the program's idea
when it should have referred to the idea of the alleged copyrightable element of the user
interface."). In fact, the court seems unable to avoid unwittingly recognizing multiple
ideas horizontally. For example, it speaks of both the "idea for an electronic spreadsheet"
as well as the "idea for a two-line moving cursor menu . . .used in a wide variety of
computer programs including [but not limited to] spreadsheet programs." Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
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The Whelan test, in contrast, is incapable of recognizing multiple
ideas horizontally.263 The essence of the test is its simplicity: a program's
purpose is its idea and whatever is not necessary to that idea is protected
as expression.2 64 To the extent it is modified to allow for multiple ideas
horizontally, it becomes an entirely new test. As for the Brown Bag test, it
is not entirely clear whether it was intended to recognize multiple ideas at
all.2 65 Because it does not even implicitly apply the Abstractions Test, the
question never comes up-and is therefore never resolved. The weight
of the evidence suggests that the test is not intended to recognize multi-
ple ideas horizontally.26 6 Nevertheless, it would not fundamentally alter
the test to have it do so. When, during the "extrinsic test," the court is
analyzing the elements alleged to be similar, it could easily conclude that
some of those elements are ideas themselves rather than elements of ex-
pression,2 67 since to try to fit such elements into the doctrines of merger
or scenes afaire simply may not be appropriate in every case. 268 Thus, only
the Whelan test is incapable of recognizing multiple ideas horizontally.
263. It has already been argued that the Whelan test is able to accommodate multiple
ideas vertically. See supra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
264. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
265. The original "extrinsic test" was phrased as a "test for similarity of ideas." Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977). This wording is ambiguous: it is unclear whether it means (1) the similarity of the
ideas in A as compared to those in B, or (2) the similarity of the idea of A to the idea of B
(collectively, the "ideas"). As the "extrinsic test" became an "objective ... analys[is] of
expression," Shaw v. Lindhein, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), any pressing need for
clarification was lost.
266. Despite the ambiguity referred to in the preceding footnote, the test seemed to
assume that there was only one idea, for the court continually made reference to "the idea"
of a work-in the singular. See Sid & Marty Kroffl, 562 F.2d at 1163-65.
For a particularly striking example of the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test being applied in a
way that does not recognize multiple ideas horizontally, see Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 628-29 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding no substantial
similarity as matter of law without looking to particular elements of expression because
idea of copyrighted work "could not be more different" from idea of allegedly infringing
work).
267. It is not entirely clear that this does not occur under the present formulation of
the test. The district court in Brown Bag, for example, spoke of "the ideas [plural] inherent
in [certain] features" of the program, and also of the idea of "pull down windows."
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1995 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (emphasis added). There is a fine line between idea and expression generally; it is
all the more difficult to distinguish an idea from an expression that has merged with an
idea.
268. A simple example would be the recent practice of including a spell-checking
feature in spreadsheet programs. The average person would see this as a good idea, but if a
program has only one idea horizontally, it becomes an expression. Moreover, it would be
difficult to say that spell-checking "merges" with the idea of a spreadsheet program, or is in
any way necessary for a spreadsheet program, since spreadsheets did rather well for a long
time without them. By comparison, spell-checkers have long been standard on word
processors and may well have "merged" with, or at least be scenes afaire to, the idea of a
word processing program. However, without recognizing spell-checking as an idea in
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Another line of comparison looks to the amount of protection af-
forded by each test. The WMelan and Paperback decisions have been criti-
cized as providing too much protection.2 69 However, in the case of
Paperback, the criticism is generally directed not at the test itself, but rather
at the result reached by the court.2 70 Since the present concern is with
the tests themselves, such criticism need not concern us at this point.27'
However, Whelan is a different matter. Whelan only allows for one idea in
a computer program, and this is broadly defined as the program's pur-
pose or function; everything that is not necessary to that idea is pro-
tected.272 Very little can ever be said to be necessary to a broadly defined
idea. Thus, a great deal of protection is inherently provided by the Whe-
lan test. To the extent that the "intrinsic test" in Brown Bag is a "total
concept and feel" test,273 it, too, has been criticized for being over-protec-
tive in that "total concept and feel" is a very broad concept that can easily
blur the distinction between expression and idea. 274 However, because
the "intrinsic test" seems to be dependent upon the results obtained from
the "extrinsic test," it is not clear that there is very much room for over-
protection in the Brown Bag test.
275
The Altai decision, on the other hand, has been criticized as being
underprotective. 276 A persuasive argument can be made on this point:
because the "successive filtering method" does such a thorough job in
filtering out unprotectable elements, very little remains for the compari-
son stage that could support a finding of substantial similarity. The "ex-
trinsic test" of Brown Bag is susceptible to the same criticism: it, too,
filters out unprotectable elements before comparison in the "intrinsic
stage."277 Although the filtering is justifiable under the various limiting
itself, it could easily be seen as an original element of expression in a spreadsheet program.
If so, it could be copyrighted and no other spreadsheet programs would be able to include
a spell-checking feature.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 138-146 and supra text accompanying notes
169-176.
270. See supra text accompanying note 169.
271. The question of whether the 1-2-3 user interface should be copyrightable is really
a policy question independent of whether the Paperback test is compatible with, say, the
Altai test; that policy question is taken up later, see infra subsection III.D.2.
272. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
273. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
275. It seems that the "intrinsic test" only considers those elements of expression that
were not eliminated from protection by the "extrinsic test"-though this is not entirely
clear. See supra notes 190, 192, 196-197 and accompanying text. If that is the case, then
"total concept and feel" is not nearly as broad as it would be if it could consider the work as
a whole, including unprotected elements.
276. See Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 30, Special Update 2-5 ("The Altai test
reduces protection for nonliteral elements of a program."); see also Recent Case, supra
note 233, at 510-11 (arguing that the Altai test will "leave non-literal elements of computer
programs under-protected").
277. Again, it is not entirely clear that this is the case. See supra note 275.
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doctrines of copyright-especially because of the limited range of poten-
tial expression in computer programs278-the overall result of an ap-
proach such as the Altai test and possibly the Brown Bag test seems to be
inherently underprotective.
Any comparison of the Paperback and Altai tests makes it readily ap-
parent that the two tests are very similar.2 79 In the first step of each test,
the court applies the Abstractions Test;28 0 in the second step, the court
eliminates unprotectable elements from consideration;28' and in the
third step, the court evaluates the remaining elements to determine
whether copyright infringement has occurred.28 2 The major difference
between the two tests lies with the second step. The second step of the
Paperback test exempts only "elements essential to the expression of [a
given] idea."283 The Altai test breaks this step down to consider sepa-
rately elements from the public domain, the doctrine of merger, and the
doctrine of scenes afaire-and then further dissects the concept of scenes a
faire in the context of computer programs.28 4 This represents a very so-
phisticated understanding of the limiting principles of copyright-but it
also leads to underprotection.
The Brown Bag test is also fairly similar to the Altai test in that it too
filters out any and all unprotectable elements. 28 5 However, the Altai test
has the advantage of organization: the court presented all the doctrines
in one multi-step test, with specific guidance for the computer program
context.28 6 Brown Bag never does this and therefore provides very little
guidance for the courts that have to apply its tests. 287 This, however, is
not an inherent feature of the Brown Bag test; a subsequent court could
easily provide greater organization and guidance.
Lastly, the Altai court, unlike the courts in Paperback and Brown Bag,
limited the applicability of its test to a great, and uncertain, degree. The
Altai test was adopted to determine the copyrightability of a program's
278. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
279. Indeed,Judge Keeton, who developed the Paperback test, stated that the two tests
are "compatible substantively, though different in methodology." Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 212 (D. Mass. 1992) (Borland H).
280. Compare supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text with supra notes 218-219
and accompanying text.
281. Compare supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text with supra notes 222-226
and accompanying text.
282. Compare supra note 163 and accompanying text with supra note 230 and
accompanying text. For Judge Keeton's own comparison of the two tests, see Borland H,
799 F. Supp. at 211-12.
283. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass.
1990).
284. See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 184, 187 and accompanying text.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 222-226; supra notes 240-244 and
accompanying text.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 203-205.
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structure in particular, and not that of any other nonliteral elements. 288
The court expressed the following reservation: "As a caveat, we note that
our decision here does not control infringement actions regarding cate-
gorically distinct works, such as certain types of screen displays. These
items represent products of computer programs, rather than the pro-
grams themselves ....- 28 9 It is unclear how this will be interpreted, but it
might be understood to exclude the user interface of a program from
protection under this test.29 0 In this respect, the Altai test might be sig-
nificantly different-i.e., less protective-than the Paperback and Brown
Bag tests. 29 1
Statements made by the district court in the Altai case are even
stronger: "Since the behavior aspect of a computer program [-the pro-
gram as it functions in the computer, rather than the program as writ-
ten-] falls within the statutory terms 'process', 'system', and 'method of
operation', it may be excluded by [17 U.S.C. statute 102(b)] from copy-
right protection."292 The user interface could be understood to be a "be-
havior aspect of a computer program," since it is the means by which the
user communicates with the computer. Thus, it might actually be consid-
ered entirely uncopyrightable under Altai.
2 93
However, there is nothing intrinsic to the Altai test that requires such
reservation and limitation.294 For instance, the Nimmer treatise did not
so qualify its own test, the "successive filtering method,"295 on which the
288. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992)
("We must determine the scope of the copyright protection that extends to a program's
non-literal structure [only].") (emphasis added); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note
30, Special Update 2 (The test was "adopted solely to measure infringement in program
code and structure. The court took pains to emphasize that its discussion does not apply
to other forms of copyright infringement... ").
289. Altai, 982 F.2d at 703.
290. If, as will be argued later, the user interface is better understood as a structure
than as an audiovisual work, excluding the user interface from protection under this test
and consigning it to protection as an audiovisual work may effectively exclude it from
protection entirely. See infra subsection III.D.2.
291. The Paperback test obviously provides protection to the user interface-that was
the holding of the case. The Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test of the Ninth Circuit has also been
held to protect the user interface of a computer program-in theory-if it is sufficiently
expressive in a given case. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989). Whether this will prove to be the case in fact after
Brown Bag remains to be seen.
292. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
293. The Second Circuit's approving reference to this general section of the district
court's opinion, Altai, 982 F.2d at 705-06, highlights the reality of such concerns.
Such a result would be at odds with Paperback's decision to protect the user interface.
See supra text accompanying note 162. In addition, it would likely not be the correct
decision. See infra subsection III.D.2.
294. The court may have imposed such limitations, but even if it did so, the test would
not be fundamentally altered if the limitations were subsequently dropped.
295. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F], at 13-102.9 to
-102.35.
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Altai test is based.2 96 It seems that the Altai court was merely being cau-
tious because of the dynamic nature of the computer industry.
297
Although this is responsible behavior on the part of the court-to decide
only what is necessary and to limit its holding accordingly-there is no
reason for the test to be bound by these reservations. In fact, the court
recognized that under its newly announced test, "the exact contours of
copyright protection for non-literal program structure [we]re not com-
pletely clear," and "trust[ed] that as future cases are decided, those limits
w[ould] become better defined."298 The court even stated that, in an ap-
propriate case, its decision "should not be read to foreclose the district
courts... from utilizing a modified version [of the test]."299 Thus, the
Altai test need not be interpreted as being so fundamentally limited as a
first reading might suggest; the test can survive without the caution and
rigidity of the opinions.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the four tests are not all compat-
ible with each other. The Whelan test bears no real resemblance to any
other test; it is a unique and simple test that cannot be reconciled with
the others. The Brown Bag test is also significantly different from the
others, though it is somewhat similar to the Altai test. The Paperback and
Altai tests, however, are reconcilable: if the Altai decision is not inter-
preted strictly and the second step of the Paperback test is expanded, the
tests become remarkably similar.
B. Which Approach Is Best?
The ideal test would be both simple to apply and accurate in its ef-
fect-i.e., neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. Often, however,
some tradeoff must be made between simplicity and "accuracy." The
Whelan test has the advantage of simplicity: 0 0 the court need merely de-
termine the program's function to arrive at its idea, and then determine
what is unnecessary to that idea to arrive at the protected expression.
3 0 '
The other three tests are more complicated. 30 2 However, the desire for
simplicity cannot overcome the need for accuracy.3 0 3 Especially in a field
296. See supra note 217.
297. See Alta 982 F.2d at 706.
298. Id. at 712.
299. Id. at 706.
300. See Englund, supra note 145, at 881 ("Perhaps the single virtue of the Whelan
rule is that it is easy to apply.").
301. See supra text accompanying note 132.
302. Compare the Whelan test, supra text accompanying notes 131-133, with the
Paperback test, supra text accompanying notes 154-165, the Brown Bag test, supra text
accompanying notes 182-195, and the Altai test, supra text accompanying notes 217-231.
The Altai test seems the most complicated.
303. Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) ("[E]ase of application
alone is not an excuse for ignoring... Congress' policy decisions.").
The Whelan court itself agreed to this in principle: "Ease of application is not,
however, a sufficient counterweight to the considerations we have adduced on behalf of
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as complex as computer technology, it is foolish to believe that a simple
resolution of delicate issues is likely to be adequate.
In fact, the Paperback and Altai tests are not unduly complicated. By
breaking down an enormous task-that of deciding which nonliteral ele-
ments of a computer program should be protected-into smaller, pre-
defined subtasks-the application of particular copyright doctrines such
as merger or scenes afaire-problem solving becomes a much simpler pro-
cess.304 Although the Brown Bag test is similar in many respects, it never
adequately defines the steps involved.305 The result is a test that is diffi-
cult to apply-which promotes neither simplicity nor accuracy.30 6 Signifi-
cantly greater guidance is needed from the Ninth Circuit to overcome
this problem. By contrast, the Whelan test is wholly inadequate in terms
of accuracy: it is hopelessly overbroad.30 7 Thus, an approach similar to
the Paperback or Altai tests is superior to the others in terms of the trade-
off between simplicity and accuracy.
A second consideration in evaluating these tests is the extent to
which each test furthers the "promot[ion of] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."308 Optimally, the law should strike a balance between the
incentive to create that comes from the prospect of personal gain30 9 on
the one hand, and the ability to improve on the ideas of predecessors on
the other hand. CONTU310 believed that this should hold true for com-
puter programs. However, it insisted that "[c]opyright should not grant
anyone more economic power than is necessary to achieve the incentive
to create."31 1 Since this is fundamental to copyright law, every court mak-
ing a copyright decision must believe that its approach furthers this
goal-and the courts have stated as much.3
1 2
our position." Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir.
1986).
304. Any computer programmer would attest to this fact. Compare the process of
developing a complex computer program, described at supra text accompanying notes
20-28.
305. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
306. In addition, the district courts will each be forced independently to interpret the
test itself, which will lead to inconsistent results.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 138-143, 263-264.
308. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
309. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[E]ncouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors.").
310. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
311. CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 12.
312. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992)
("We are satisfied that the three step approach we have just outlined not only comports
with, but advances the constitutional policies underlying the Copyright Act."); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The rule
proposed here . . . would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting
their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of
new computer devices that accomplish the same end."); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
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The question of which approach best advances the goal of copyright
law is difficult to answer. It may be that computer programs are in need
of a great deal of protection because of the ease with which they may be
copied or imitated; yet it is equally possible that existing financial incen-
tives alone are sufficient to stimulate innovation and therefore eradicate
the need for protection. 13 This question is simply not capable of theo-
retical resolution. Therefore, the courts are in need of legislative gui-
dance to make the necessary policy decision. In the meantime, however,
the courts are forced to make difficult decisions.3 14 Yet there is no con-
sensus as to what amount of protection efficiently promotes progress in
the computer software industry. The four decisions demonstrate that di-
vergent opinions as to what is appropriate lead to different approaches.
While opinions abound as to which test is most likely to promote prog-
ress, none of the approaches has been empirically proven to be
misguided.
In the absence of any indication that Congress intended special
treatment for computer programs,315 the courts should look to well-
established principles of copyright in order to determine which aspects of
a computer program should be considered copyrightable. These princi-
ples have guided the courts well throughout the years in the promotion
of progress in the face of technological developments and should con-
tinue to do so in this dynamic area.
Overall, the Altai test displays the richest understanding of the vari-
ous concepts that define and limit copyrightability, particularly in the
computer program context. The Brown Bag test has the advantage of be-
ing a general test for copyrightability:3 16 it was not specifically created for
the computer context. However, it is a difficult and confusing test.31 7 In
addition, it does not adequately assess the interrelationship between idea
and expression in a copyrighted work.318 The net result is a test that
could hardly be applied in a consistent manner. The Whelan test is en-
tirely too simplistic and amounts to only a rough amalgamation of the
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 78 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The encouragement of innovation
requires no more.").
313. Cf. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 46 (discussing alternate possible paths Congress
could take to further constitutional goal).
314. Cf. id. at 53 ("Rather than itself drawing the boundary line between
copyrightable and non-copyrightable elements of computer programs, Congress has
mandated that courts ... determin[e] this boundary line.").
315. The CONTU Final Report suggested no special treatment for computer
programs. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
316. This is not entirely true. The Extrinsic-Intrinsic Test as modified by Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990)-i.e., the Brown Bag test---"applies by its own
terms only to literary works." Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476
(9th Cir. 1992).
317. See supra notes 305-306 and accompanying text.
318. This is because it does not apply the Abstractions Test. See supra notes 256-258
and accompanying text.
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concepts of merger and scenes afaire.3 19 The Paperback test reflects a more
precise understanding of these concepts3 20 and applies the Abstractions
Test as well.321 However, only the Altai test explicitly incorporates in a
systematic way the Abstractions Test, the concept of merger, a very sophis-
ticated understanding of the concept of scenes afaire,3 22 and the concept
of public domain materials.3 23 In short, from the perspective of copy-
right doctrine, the Altai test is superior to the others.
However, the Altai court's severe limitation of the applicability of its
test3 24 detracts from its doctrinal purity: these limits are based on consid-
erations other than copyright principles.3 25 Fortunately, this aspect of
the Altai opinion is not intrinsic to the test that it announced;3 26 thus, it
could be eliminated without substantially altering the nature of the
test.3 27 Moreover, despite Altai's elaboration on how copyright doctrines
should apply in the computer program context, there is no reason why its
test could not be used as a general test for substantial similarity; in fact,
Professor Nimmer believes that his "successive filtering method"-on
which the Altai test is based-should be.3 28 Thus, the Altai test can pro-
vide a framework based entirely on existing copyright principles.
In conclusion, if the determination as to which test is the "best" is to
be made on broad policy grounds, then the conclusion will be based sim-
ply on each decision-maker's subjective belief as to the likely effects of
each test. There is no means by which such effects can be deduced logi-
cally; even empirical observation would likely not lead to obvious conclu-
sions. However, if the determination is to be based on copyright
doctrine, a principled decision is possible. The Altai test-if not the Altai
opinion-presents the best framework for an analysis of substantial simi-
larity. The only remaining problem is the underprotection inherent to the
test, a problem discussed in the next section.
319. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235-36 (2d
Cir. 1992) (discussing the Baker case and scenes a faire).
320. The second stage of this test explicitly allows not only for "elements essential to
expression of [an] idea," but also for elements which are "one of only a few ways of
expressing the idea." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61
(D.Mass 1990). Compare id. with Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
321. For a review of the Abstractions Test, see supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
322. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2d Cir.
1992); see also 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] (3], at 13-102.21 to -
102.28. The external constraints considered in this sophisticated understanding of scenes a
faire are briefly discussed at supra notes 240-244 and accompanying text.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 222, 226.
324. See supra notes 288-292 and accompanying text.
325. See supra text accompanying note 297.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 294-299.
327. As mentioned in the previous section, to the extent that those limitations are
eliminated, the Altai test begins to take on the character of the Paperback decision. See
supra section III.A.
328. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F], at 13-102.9 to -102.35.
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C. Reincorporating Compilations
An inescapable failing of the Altai test is that its thoroughness in
filtering out unprotectable elements of expression leads to underprotec-
tion. Due to the rigors of the underlying test, perhaps even a tempered
approach by the court could not escape its strictness. For example, sup-
pose that a programmer develops a program that is composed entirely of
elements that are uncopyrightable: part of the program was dictated by
efficiency concerns, part by external factors to some degree or another,
and part comes from the public domain. Assume further, however, that
the programmer has selected, coordinated, and arranged these un-
copyrightable elements in the program in a creative and original manner.
Under even a tempered Altai approach, this program would be afforded
absolutely no protection by copyright. This result is inappropriate.
It might seem at first that the Brown Bag test solves this problem
through the "intrinsic test." It does not, however, since summary judg-
ment may be granted by the court if there are no objective similarities in
the individual elements of expression.3 29 Thus, the intrinsic test would
never be triggered in the above example. Moreover, even when the "in-
trinsic test" is triggered, it is not clear that the work as a whole may be
considered.330 If only the protected elements may be considered in the
"intrinsic test," then Brown Bag is no better in this respect than Altai.
Application of the compilations doctrine331 rectifies this failing. As
mentioned above, works consisting entirely of uncopyrightable elements
are often protected by the copyright law under the rubric of "compila-
tions."3 32 Based on an analogy to compilations, 333 copyright protection
should subsist in computer programs even if they consist entirely of un-
copyrightable elements if those elements were selected or arranged in an
original manner. Therefore, an additional step should be added to
Altai's "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test. After the court has com-
pleted the successive filtering of the second step of the Altai test, it should
re-evaluate the elements that have been excluded as uncopyrightable to
determine whether there are elements, or groupings of elements, that, in
329. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 192.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287-89 (1991) ("[Elven a directory that contains
absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum
for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.").
333. This would not be unprecedented. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990):
If particular characteristics not distinctive individually have been brought
together in a way that makes the "whole" a distinctive expression of an idea...
then the "whole" may be copyrightable. The statutory provisions regarding
"compilation,"... are not essential to this conclusion, but do reinforce it.
Id. at 67; see also infra text accompanying notes 340-342, discussing "total concept and
feel."
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their selection, coordination, or arrangement, are sufficiently original to
merit copyright protection as a group in a manner analogous to compila-
tions. This would be a "reincorporation" stage since elements previously
excluded from copyright protection are now reincorporated in the analy-
sis, albeit as compilations.
The leading Supreme Court decision on the subject of compilations
is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.3 34 There, the court
stated that, while originality is a requirement for copyright protection, it
requires "only that the author make the selection or arrangement [of the
pre-existing materials] independently (i.e., without copying that selection
or arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal
level of creativity."3 35  The level of creativity required is low;
"[p1resumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test .... a33 6
The Feist opinion provides guidance for the reincorporation stage.
The courts should take notice of the fact that programs, even if consisting
entirely of uncopyrightable elements, can be "original works of author-
ship" deserving of copyright protection if the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of those elements in the program is original. Although
most programs would receive protection under this approach, this result
need not be feared as overly protective. The Feist court stated that compi-
lations receive only limited protection from copyright law.33 7 Thus, the
protection that a computer program would receive would also be limited:
only the elements that owe their origin to the programmer would be pro-
tected 338-i.e., the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the un-
copyrightable elements in the program, but not the uncopyrightable
elements themselves. Any elements that are afforded protection only as a
compilation would thus receive significantly less protection than they
would otherwise: Copyright infringement of compilations "consisting
largely of uncopyrightable elements.., should not be found in the ab-
sence of 'bodily appropriation of expression.'"s9
This proposal bears resemblance to the "total concept and feel" doc-
trine,340 but the compilations approach is superior. The concern behind
"total concept and feel" is the same: that even if the individual elements
comprising a work are not protectable, still the work as a whole may de-
334. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). Although this case deals specifically with compilations of
facts, as opposed to compilations of other "materials," the copyright law makes no
distinction between compilations of data (i.e., facts) and compilations of other materials.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Thus, the Feist opinion should not be interpreted as being
limited to the context of factual compilations but should be considered applicable to
compilations generally.
335. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
336. Id. at 1294.
337. See id. at 1295.
338. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
339. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(quoting Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989)).
340. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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serve protection.3 4 1 The problem with the "total concept and feel" doc-
trine is that it is amorphous-it is a non-test that allows gut reaction to
prevail over critical analysis. In doing so, it comes dangerously close to
protecting ideas.3 42 The addition of the compilations doctrine expands
the scope of the Altai test and accommodates these concerns while simul-
taneously avoiding the overbreadth of "total concept and feel." It strikes
the appropriate balance between the two, providing the substance
needed for analysis while ensuring that only expression is protected.
One final point should be made with regard to the proposed
reincorporation stage. In applying it, the court should recognize the fact
that a work may be held to consist of more than one compilation, just as a
work "may consist of a mixture of numerous ideas and expressions."
3 43
For example, the overall structure of the program may be one compila-
tion,3 44 the user interface may be another, and a database included with
the program-i.e., the standard type of compilation-may be yet a third.
Each "compilation" would simply be one more element to be evaluated in
the final comparison stage.
With the elimination of the unnecessary limitations imposed by the
court 345 and the addition of this reincorporation stage, the Altai test be-
comes complete. In theory, at least, it should provide protection to all
the elements and only to the elements of a computer program that de-
serve protection. Although decisions will still be "ad hoc" to a certain
extent, this Modified Altai Test provides the decision-maker with a frame-
work for determining copyrightability that is solidly grounded in well-
established copyright principles.
D. Re-Evaluation of the Concerns Often Raised Regarding Copyrightability
There are two ways that two works may be substantially similar with-
out being identical. Most people are aware that "fragmented literal simi-
larity"34 6-limited but literal copying-is prohibited; but "it is equally
clear that two works may not be literally identical and yet, for the pur-
poses of copyright infringement, may be found to be substantially simi-
lar."3 47 This is the case of "comprehensive nonliteral similarity": one
work duplicates the essence or structure of another without any literal
341. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-11 (9th Cir.
1970).
342. See supra notes 104, 200-202.
343. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[F] [1],at13-102.18.
344. When the structure of a program is protected only as a compilation, it will
receive limited protection against only detailed copying. See supra text accompanying
note 339.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 294-299.
346. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 16, § 13.03[A] [2]1,at13--46to
-54.
347. Id. § 13.03 [A], at 13-27 to -28.
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copying.3 48 The courts have wisely noted that such copying is prohibited
generally and should therefore also be prohibited with regard to com-
puter programs.
349
1. Whether the Structure of a Computer Program Should Be Protected. -
Since there may be "comprehensive nonliteral similarities" between the
structures of two programs, there should be no question but that the
structure of computer programs should be protected-if in any given
case it is sufficiently original.
Many commentators have expressed fears that the Whelan decision
went too far in extending protection to the structure of computer pro-
grams.350 However, if Whelan is interpreted to provide protection only to
detailed structures351-and only when they are not necessary to the pro-
gram352-then these concerns should be allayed to a great extent.
Regardless of whether the Whelan test would provide too much pro-
tection, however, the Modified Altai Test certainly does not. The struc-
ture of a program would be protected only if it withstood the successive
filtering of uncopyrightable elements: elements dictated by efficiency, or
by external factors, or elements taken from the public domain would not
be protected. But, if there remains after all of this elimination "a core of
protectable expression,"353 or if despite the lack of such a core, the selec-
tion, coordination, or arrangement is sufficiently original to deserve pro-
tection, 354 then there would be no reason to exclude the structure from
copyright protection.
It certainly may be the case that from a policy perspective even this is
too much protection. However, the likely effect of the successive filtering
of the Modified Altai Test is that few structures will be protected-and
even then only against the most detailed of copying. This is not likely to
be overprotective. On the other hand, this may provide too little protec-
tion, but this also seems unlikely. Prudence dictates that because of the
limited range of potential expression inherent to computer program-
348. See id. § 13.03[A][1], at 13-29 ("By this is meant a similarity not just as to a
particular line or paragraph or other minor segment, but where the fundamental essence
or structure of one work is duplicated in another."). An example of "comprehensive
nonliteral similarity" is a similarity in the plot or the major characters of two stories.
349. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992);
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1990). While the
Brown Bag court did not do so explicitly, this is clearly implicit throughout the opinion.
See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 passim (9th Cir. 1992).
350. See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
351. The Whelan court stated that "the detailed structure of the Dentalab program is
part of the expression ... of that program." 797 F.2d at 1239; see also Raymond T.
Nimmer, supra note 30, Special Update 1-3 ("The court's review hinged .. .on the
particularity and detail of copying.").
352. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
353. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710.
354. See supra section III.D.
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ming,3 55 the protection afforded to the structure of computer programs
should be less than that afforded to the structures of other literary works
with greater potential for creativity. That result is also dictated by the
doctrines of merger and scenes a faire.
356
Regardless of the resolution of that issue, the structure of literary
works is protected under copyright law;3 57 thus, the structure of a com-
puter program must also be protected. However, since computer pro-
grams were not afforded special protection under the 1976 Act,35 8 their
structures should be protected only to the extent they survive scrutiny
under the Modified Altai Test.
2. Whether the User Interface Should Be Protected. - A user interface re-
lies heavily on screen displays.3 59 Therefore, it might be argued that the
user interface should be protected, if at all, under the category of "audio-
visual works" rather than "literary works."3 60 However, although the
screen displays of a program may also be copyrightable as an audiovisual
work, the user interface consists of much more than mere screen dis-
plays. 3 61 It is possible for two programs to have user interfaces that func-
tion identically and yet have very different screen displays. 362 Thus, a
copyright for screen displays would not provide sufficient protection for
the user interface; it is often the substance of the user interface-e.g., the
hierarchical organization of the function menus-rather than merely the
355. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
356. In addition, the result would also seem to be dictated by the requirement of
originality, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991)
("Originality is a constitutional requirement."), since, if there is a limited range of
potential expression, the threshold for originality must be raised.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 346-349.
358. In passing the 1976 Act, Congress decided to wait for the CONTU
recommendations before taking any action on the matter. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-53. The CONTU Final Report did not suggest any special treatment for
computer programs. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
359. See supra text accompanying note 30.
360. Support for this proposition can be found in Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). In Stern, the defendant had manufactured a "knock-off" version
of plaintiff's "Scramble" video game without actually copying any of the code. The court
rejected defendant's assertion that "only the written computer program" was entitled to
protection. Id. at 855. Thus, it extended protection to the nonliteral elements of the
program-but it did so using the category of "audiovisual work" rather than "literary
work." The court also held that "the player's participation does not withdraw the
audiovisual work from copyright eligibility." Id. at 856. Based on this case it could be
argued that the output of an interactive user interface-which consists mostly of screen
displays-should be protected as an audiovisual work rather than a literary work.
361. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
362. While the screen displays of the VP-Planner program in the Paperback case may
have been virtually identical, the displays in the Quattro Pro program at issue in Borland II
were very different. By converting the 1-2-3 user interface from a "two-line moving-cursor
menu" system to a "pull-down bar menu[ ]" system, Borland achieved an entirely different
look for its Quattro Pro program. Nevertheless, the Quattro Pro program copied the user
interface's substance in its entirety. This was rightly held to infringe Lotus' copyright. See
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217-20 (D. Mass. 1992).
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screen displays that are generated by it, that developers want pro-
tected.3 63 That substance is derived from the overall structure of a pro-
gram-or from certain of its subroutines-and therefore deserves
protection as a literary work.3
64
As the Paperback court demonstrated, a user interface may be expres-
sive.365 Nevertheless, there is the possibility that a court, in the course of
successively filtering out a program's uncopyrightable elements, may im-
properly decide that a particular user interface is not protectable. 366 The
Reincorporation stage proposed above3 67 allows the judge to re-evaluate
such a decision given that the particular choices made in designing the
user interface involve creative expression and originality and as such
should be protected.
It should be noted that the current trends in the computer industry
suggest that the compatibility/standardization concerns that are often
raised 368 are not likely to be as problematic in the future. Because of the
surge in popularity of operating systems utilizing graphical user interfaces
("GUI")-beginning with the Macintosh, and now including OS/2 and
Windows for the IBM PC-application programs are beginning to "look
and feel" much more similar.369 Thus, users will be less "locked into" a
specific program merely because the training costs involved in switching
to a new system are prohibitive.370 Incidentally, this very development
puts the nails on the coffin of "total concept and feel":371 it becomes
363. At times, developers may want the screen displays protected. See the Apple cases,
supra note 9. In such cases, the copyright should be dealt with as an audiovisual work.
However, this should not obscure the fact that at times, the substance of the user interface,
rather than the screen displays, is important. See the Borland cases, supra note 154. In
such cases, the user interface ought to be treated as a nonliteral element of a literary work,
the program. Although the test may be the same in either case, treating a user interface as
an audiovisual work may improperly result in a lack of protection.
364. Congress intended computer programs to be protected as a literary work. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
365. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65-68 (D.
Mass. 1990).
366. This could easily happen under a stringent application of any of the "filtering"
concepts-merger, scenes afaire, or public domain.
367. See supra section III.C.
368. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
369. IBM developed SAA (Systems Application Architecture) standards to advance
compatibility among computers and programs. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note
16, § 13.03[F] [3] [c],at13-102.25. This standard has been incorporated into the Windows
operating system:
Conformance to SAA standards has been most beneficial to users. New
applications must now adhere to the Windows standard, thereby adhering to the
consistent SAA standard. It has become easier and easier to quickly learn and use
new applications. Many Windows applications have many of the same menu
choices, and the methods of accessing and navigating the menus are the same.
Judd Robins, Supercharging Windows 12-13 (1992).
370. See, e.g., Verdesca, supra note 169, at 1076 ("Without compatibility, today's
computer user becomes locked into a specific vendor's application.").
371. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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meaningless in the computer context when operating systems are designed
to make applications "look and feel" similar. The similarity among appli-
cation programs also has another effect: much of a user interface that
operates under a GUI will be standardized 72 and to that extent will not
be protected. Nevertheless, an application's user interface as a whole,
which likely involves some originality in the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of its features, would be copyrightable and protected at least
from duplication of the entire work.
3 73
To the extent, then, that a user interface is expressive and/or crea-
tive as a whole, it should be protected under copyright principles. Copy-
ing a user interface in its entirety is almost certainly an infringement of
the original program's copyright because it would necessarily involve
copying whatever original and hence copyrightable elements were
present.
CONCLUSION
Of the four tests for determining the copyrightability of the nonlit-
eral elements of computer programs provided in the helan, Paperback,
Brown Bag, and Altai cases, a modified version of the Altai test is the best
approach from the perspective of copyright principles. However, the
question of which test would be the best from a policy perspective is diffi-
cult and not one in which the courts should heavily involve themselves.
Since the goal of copyright law is to "promote progress," however, a
resolution of such policy issues is necessary. The only body capable of
making a legitimate determination of those issues is Congress. In having
established CONTU to assess those issues in the seventies, Congress was
acting responsibly; in not having acted since-as, for example, by estab-
lishing a CONTU l-Congress has shown lamentable apathy. As these
four cases show, the result has been the development of various incom-
patible standards. Congress must act soon to put an end to the uncer-
tainty that prevails in this area. Congressional action on such issues
would not only be welcome,3 74 but also well overdue.
37 5
372. For instance, most Windows applications have a menu bar that begins with the
command "File" which usually includes in its submenu, among other choices, "New,"
"Open. .. " "Close," "Save," "Save As... " "Print ... " and "Exit"; the second command is
usually "Edit," and includes in its submenu the choices "Undo," "Cut," "Copy," and "Paste";
et cetera. See, e.g., Microsoft Windows Write Version 3.1, WordPerfect for Windows
Version 5.2, Quattro Pro for Windows Version 5.0, and Lotus 1-2-3 Release 4 for Windows.
373. See supra section III.C; cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The fact that some of these specific command terms are
quite obvious or merge with the idea of such a particular command term does not
preclude copyrightability for the command structure taken as a whole.").
374. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)
("[N]ow that more than 12 years have passed since CONTU issued its final report, the
resolution of this specific issue could benefit from further legislative investigation-
perhaps a CONTU II.").
375. The CONTU Final Report, supra note 50, at 2, recommended that "[a]ny
legislation enacted as a result of these recommendations... be subject to a periodic review
to determine its adequacy in the light of continuing technological change."
292 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:242
In the meantime, however, the courts must struggle with this prob-
lem. The Altai test is a commendable effort at developing a test based on
well-established copyright principles, but falls short in a number of im-
portant respects. The Modified Altai Test presented in this Note reme-
dies these shortcomings and therefore provides the appropriate legal test
to determine copyrightability in the absence of any legislative intent to
provide special treatment for computer programs.
Julian Velasco
